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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 The repeated occurrences of protest violence during or following Black Lives 
Matter (BLM) demonstrations has been an issue for the United States since the mass 
demonstrations of Ferguson, MO in August of 2014.  Since then, the United States has 
experienced a trend of organized demonstrations which follow officer-involved shootings 
of primarily African American civilians.  How and why communities around the nation 
react to police violence can vary, as do the explanations for the responses of community 
members, demonstrators, and police officers.  The protests of Ferguson, MO (2014) and 
of North Minneapolis, MN (2015) were similarly prompted by police shootings but each 
experienced a different kind of protest and police response.  This thesis explores how 
different theoretical perspectives illuminate differences between how Ferguson and North 
Minneapolis reacted to police violence and argues that multiple theories are needed for 
analyzing such protests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The repeated occurrences of protest violence during or following Black Lives 
Matter (BLM) demonstrations has been an issue for the United States since the mass 
demonstrations of Ferguson, MO in August of 2014.  Since then, the United States has 
experienced a trend of organized demonstrations which follow officer-involved shootings 
of primarily African American civilians.1  How and why communities around the nation 
react to police violence can vary, as do the explanations for the responses of community 
members, demonstrators, and police officers.  The protests of Ferguson, MO (2014) and 
of North Minneapolis, MN (2015) were similarly prompted by police shootings but each 
experienced a different kind of protest and police responses.  This thesis explores how 
different theoretical perspectives illuminate differences between how Ferguson and North 
Minneapolis reacted to police violence and argues that multiple theories are needed for 
analyzing such protests and finding ways to prevent further violence.  
Racially charged officer-involved shootings and the demonstrations that follow 
and can become violent cost the lives of civilians and police officers as well as officers’ 
careers.  Violent protests may cost upwards of millions of dollars in the violence inflicted 
on people and in the looting/destruction of property.  The mass demonstrations of 
Ferguson, MO ended after many instances of confrontational-violence through the 17 
                                               
1 Other examples involved Eric Garner in New York City and Freddie Gray in Baltimore.  Protests 
following Garner’s death remained relatively peaceful in NYC, but similar protests in other US cities (e.g., 
Berkeley) turned violent.  See Olivia Laughland, Kayla Epstein, and Jessica Gelnza, “Eric Garner protests 
continue in cities across America through second night,” The Guardian (December 5, 2014): 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/dec/05/eric-garner-case-new-york-protests-continue-through-
second-night.  The response after Gray’s funeral began peaceful but experienced aggressive police 
responses which prompted the demonstrations to turn into riots.  See Jenna McLaughlin and Sam Brodey, 
“Eyewitnesses: The Baltimore Riots Didn’t Start the Way You Think,” Mother Jones (April 28, 2015): 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/04/how-baltimore-riots-began-mondawmin-purge/. 
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days.2  The occupation in North Minneapolis, MN remained peaceful and, largely, did not 
experience any confrontational violence over the course of 18 days.3  This exploratory 
study employs secondary research to examine what can be learned by applying seven 
theories pertaining to the occurrence of protest violence in explaining the differing 
reactions to police violence experienced in Ferguson and North Minneapolis.  My 
analysis will explore each multi-day incident to illuminate in the protest reactions by 
utilizing the explanations of three theories focuses on the micro-context,4 three focused 
on police and protester practices,5 and one theory on the macro-contextual effects of 
timing and feedback.6 
This thesis presents a series of charts (nine total) to illustrate the kinds of theories 
and ideas analyzed in each section.  Each theory (i.e., micro context; police practices and 
protester interactions; and macro-context) has a chart with varying descriptors dependent 
to its section.  Charts in the Literature Review section showcase each theory’s name, 
contributing author(s), and core ideas.  Charts in the Methodology section showcase each 
theory’s name as well as the applicable evidence from the case studies.  Charts in the 
Analysis section showcase explanations for each theory’s findings.7   
                                               
2 See James Queally, “Ferguson unrest: What you need to know,” Los Angeles Times (March 17, 2015): 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-ferguson-unrest-what-you-need-to-know-20150312-
htmlstory.html. 
3 See Jon Collins, Tim Nelson, and Matt Sepic, “Mpls. Police clear out 4th Precinct protest site,” Minnesota 
Public Radio News (December 3, 2015): https://www.mprnews.org/story/2015/12/03/4th-precinct. 
4 Explanations from context theories: ethnic-diversity, community violence, and community/policing 
culture. 
5 Explanations used from practice-based theories: threat/repression, tactical innovation, and dynamic 
interactions. 
6 Explanations used regard timing, history, event-sequence, and policy feedback. 
7 Micro-contextual theories are denoted as “C1,2,3,” police practice theories are denoted as “P1,2,3,” and 
macro-contextual theories are denoted as “T1.”7  There are three sets of three charts in the following 
sections: Charts 1-3 for the Literature Review; Charts 4-6 for the Methodology; and Charts 7-9 for the 
Analysis. 
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The remainder of the study is outlined as follows.  First, I review academic 
literature on (1) micro-contextual theories focused on the occurrence of violence; (2) 
theories on the evolution of policing/protest-policing models in conjunction with protest 
developments; and (3) macro-contextual theories rooted in American political 
development perspectives on the role of timing and sequence in explaining the order and 
value of events and policy through positive feedback mechanisms.  Second, I discuss this 
study’s methodology and discuss the evidence being examined and their relation to the 
theories discussed in the previous section.   After discussing the key contexts in both 
places, I examine the protest incidents and key events in Ferguson and North 
Minneapolis.  Fourth, I analyze how the various theories relate to each incident in 
illuminating a fuller explanation for the difference in responses between the two cities.  
Finally, I will conclude by discussing how a comprehensive explanation is needed to 
understand the different reactions to police violence, summarize key findings and their 
relationship to the theories, and note possible implications for future academic research 
into protest violence.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Micro-Contextual Explanations 
Studies on the outbreaks of violence span many academic theories, each with a 
differing explanation depending on the type of violence studied and the scope of the 
analysis.  It has been argued that it is important to factor in both private and community-
level variables when explaining the likelihood and intensity of riots.  According to the 
Ethnic-Diversity Theory (C1) of DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998), there is some correlation 
between private costs and the incidence and intensity of riots but only some community-
level variables show a correlation.  While poverty is not correlated, Theory C1 found a 
connection between higher incidence/intensity of riots and the community-level variable 
of ethnic-diversity.8  Theory C1 applies to riots and not simply demonstrations which 
exhibit violent behavior, making this theory more applicable to understanding the 
reaction from Ferguson rather than North Minneapolis. 
Chart 1: Micro-Context Theories 
Theory Name (C1, 2, 3) Author(s) Core Ideas 
 
C1: ‘Ethnic Diversity’ 
Theory 
 
DiPasquale and Glaeser 
1998 
A higher level of ethnic diversity 
in a community is linked to higher 
rates of incidence and intensity 
when it comes to riots. 
 
C2: ‘Community 
History of Violence’ 
Theory 
 
Olzak, Shanahan, & 
McEeaney 1996 
A previous history of community-
level violence (i.e., demonstrations 
which turn violent) increases the 
likelihood of future violence on a 
community-level.  
C3: ‘Area/Policing 
Culture’ Theory 
McPhail, Scweingruber, 
and McCarthy 1998; 
Gillham and Noakes 
2007 
-There is a clear sequence of 
policing styles in the US. 
-An area’s culture affects their 
policing style and how policing 
violence is utilized. 
                                               
8 Denise DiPasquale and Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better 
Citizens? (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998), p. 1-31.  
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According to the Prior-History of Community Violence Theory (C2), developed 
by Olzak, Shanahan, and McEeaney (1996); and Accomazzo (2012), there is an overlap 
of sociological and criminology perspectives illuminate possible explanations for race 
riots.  They contend that a variety of socio-political combined-factors underlie the 
involvement between political economy theory and violence.  Theory C2 notes that a 
previous history of community-level violence increases the likelihood of future 
occurrences of violence in the same way as a previous history of segregation would 
impact interracial integration (per Accomazzo, 2012; Olzak, et al., 1996).  These theorists 
argue there is a possibility to predict, and possibly prevent, collective violence through a 
heightened understanding of the interaction “between macro-level factors and the 
instability of sudden social and economic shifts,” (per Accomazzo 2012; Nassauer 2016).   
A third micro-contextual explanation focuses on an area’s policing culture.  
Community-Oriented Policing (COP) has been described as the most significant 
development in US policing in the past 50 years because of its shift in policing paradigms 
(i.e., from reactive to proactive) per Wells and Falcone (2005).  The models and styles of 
policing have evolved in response to public & private perceptions and criticisms, and this 
can be readily seen in the US from the early twentieth century to the present.  The 
varying styles characterize the policies and practices employed by law enforcement 
agencies during those specific decades.  See discussion on mid-twentieth century policing 
models in Appendix A.  The start of the community policing model (i.e., “soft policing”) 
began in the mid-1970s and grew until its peak in 2000, and, working in tandem, during 
the 1980s into the 1990s there was a communications-based policing style known as 
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‘negotiated management.’  This style uses force as a last resort and primarily attempted to 
have people police themselves per McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 1998.   
From the early 1990s and into the latter 2000s, there was a rise of a more 
aggressive and militarized policing model (i.e., “hard policing”), particularly following 
the advent of the anti-globalization movement (e.g., WTO protest in Seattle 1999) and 
heightened counter-terrorism efforts after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center.  
See discussion on aggressive policing trends in Appendix A.  The trend toward a more 
aggressive policing style has been described by researchers as ‘strategic incapacitation’ 
per Gillham and Noakes 2007.  Wood (2014) argues that this trend can be seen in the US 
and Canada and is a process of ‘Militarization of Protest Policing.’  She describes this as 
being epitomized by “pre-emptive control, fortification, the escalation of coercive 
policing strategies, incoherent negotiation, indiscriminate information gathering, and the 
portrayal of protest as a threat.”9  Calafati (2013) identified that when protests are 
primarily made up of politically or socially marginalized groups, they are seen as 
“unruly,” and when protests are viewed as such, more coercive and violent tactics tend to 
be used.10  The use of militarized policing characteristics11 can be tracked over time to 
better explain sequencing trends in policing models.  In response to the heightened 
militarization of law enforcement in this country, there have been large efforts to return 
to the community policing model, but the US may be seeing a slight return to those 
aggressive, paramilitary style policing tactics.  The removal of these tactics made up a 
portion of the demands made by groups like the Occupy movement & BLM.  After the 
                                               
9 See L.J. Wood, “Crisis and Control: Militarization of Protest Policing,” London: Pluto Press, 2014, p. 3-6: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt183pdpn. 
10 Luca Calafati, “Understanding the Return of Violent Protest Policing in Europe: Some Reflections 
Provoked by the Italian Case,” MA Dis., Sussex University (2013): 
https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=luca-essay-police-violence.pdf&site=10  
11 See additional discussion on Military-Style Policing in Appendix A. 
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Occupy demonstration in 2010 and the Ferguson protests in 2014, American policing 
then shifted away from overly-aggressive and militarized tactics under the Obama 
administration, and refocused its aims toward implementing and defining the principles 
and practices of community-oriented policing.12   
 
Police Practice-Protest Interaction Theories 
Theory P1 emphasize how social movements can have the effect and/or perception 
of threatening people in power Earl (2003).13  Varying threats are linked to new or 
confrontational protest-tactics, number of protesters, or radical goals, which can lead to 
“harsh repression” (Bromely and Shupe 1983; Davenport 2000; McAdam 1982; Wisler 
and Guigni 1999).14  Ratliff (2011) notes that certain social movement characteristics 
from past instances of protest can persist for multiple decades in the United States.  
Ratliff argues that certain social movement characteristics have a greater chance of 
bringing a police presence and/or causing violence to occur.15  
  
                                               
12 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st 
Century Policing, Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015: 
https://www.phillypolice.com/assets/forms-reports/TaskForce_FinalReport.pdf 
13 Thomas N. Ratliff, “On the Stage of Change: A Dramaturgical Approach to Violence, Social Protests, 
and Policing Styles in the U.S.,” (PhD diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2011), p. 
14-15. 
14 Ratliff, “On the Stage of Change,” p. 14. 
15 Note: Ratliff lists some of the characteristics of social movement violence as coming from there being 
African Americans or counter protesters present, the deployment of “more confrontational” tactics, the use 
of multiple tactics, and property damage occurring.   
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Chart 2: Police Practice and Protest Interaction Theories 
Theory Name (P1, 2, 3) Author(s) Core Ideas 
 
P1: ‘Threat/Repression’ 
Theory 
Ratliff 2011; and Earl 
200316 
 
Bromely and Shupe 1983; 
Davenport 2000; McAdam 
1982; and Wisler and 
Guigni 1999 
-Law enforcement is more 
likely to respond to 
protesters with repressive 
tactics when they are 
viewed as “threatening.” 
-Protesters are viewed as a 
“threat” depending on: (1) 
their use of new or 
confrontational tactics; (2) 
the number of protesters; 
and/or (3) if protesters’ 
goals are too radical.  
 
P2: ‘Tactical Innovation’ 
Theory 
Wang and Soule 2016; 
McCammon 2003; and 
Wood 2012. 
Tactical innovation is the 
emergence or use of either 
new or “novel” protest 
tactics.17   
P3: ‘Dynamic Interaction’ 
Theory 
Ratliff 2011; Collins 2008, 
2009; and Nassauer 2016 
Physical confrontations 
between protesters and 
police can only be 
established when both sides 
interact in a way that 
initiates violence. 
 
Tactical innovation is an important factor in studying social movements because it 
has been linked to protest success (McAdam 1983).18  Theory P2 can be thought of as the 
creation of either new or novel re-combinations of old protest-tactics (Wang and Soule 
2016).  Previous scholarship on the matter has two main arguments for explaining the 
                                               
16 See Bromley, David G. and Anson D. Shupe, Jr. 1983, “Repression and the Decline of Social Movement 
Organizations: The Case of New Religions,” p. 335-47 in Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies, 
edited by J. Freeman. New York: Longman as cited in Ratliff, “On the Stage of Change,” p. 14.   
See Davenport, Christian, 2000, Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious 
Politics, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers as cited in Ibid., p. 14.   
See McAdam, Doug, [1982] 1999, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, 
2nd ed, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press as cited in Ibid., p. 14. 
See Wisler, Dominique and Marco Giugni, 1999, “Under the Spotlight: The Impact of Media Attention on 
Protest Policing,” Mobilization 4(2):171-87 as cited in Ibid., p. 14. 
17 Note: Tactical innovation is linked with novel re-combinations of older protest tactics. 
18 Tactical innovation/interaction is linked with protest success for the following reasons: (1) innovation 
temporarily increases the protesters’ bargaining power and (2) the emergence of new protest techniques can 
be correlated to peak-moments in a movements’ activity.  See McAdam, Doug, “Tactical Innovation and 
the Pace of Insurgency,” (1983) American Sociological Review 48(6):735–54. 
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facilitation of tactical innovation: (1) the ‘macro-historical context’ explanation19 and (2) 
the ‘protest characteristic’ explanation,20 but I would contend that both can be utilized in 
tandem per McCammon 2003.  Tarrow (1995) argues that “newly invented forms of 
collective action” (i.e., tactical innovation) emerge at the beginning of a protest cycle.  I 
concur with and will utilize the notion that tactical innovation is rooted in “movement-
opponent dynamics,” specifically in the interplay between external environment and 
internal characteristics (McCammon 2003). Multi-issue protest21 serves as “creative 
laboratories” for tactical innovation and can generate “re-combinatorial” tactical 
innovation(s) as groups with varying interests work together (Wang and Soule 2016; 
                                               
19 See Ibid.; McAdam, Doug, Tarrow, Sidney, Tilly, Charles, 2001, Dynamics of Contention, New 
York: Cambridge University Press; McCammon, Holly J., 2003, “Out of the Parlors and into the Streets: 
The Changing Tactical Repertoire of the U.S. Women’s Suffrage Movements,” Social Forces 81(3):787–
818; Tarrow, Sidney, 1995, “Cycles of Collective Action: Between Moments of Madness and the 
Repertoire of Contention,” p. 89–115 in Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action, edited by Traugott, 
M. Durham, NC: Duke University Press; Tarrow, Sidney, 2011, Power in Movement, 3rd ed. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press; Tilly, Charles, 1978, From Mobilization to Revolution, New 
York: Random House; Tilly, Charles, 1986, The Contentious French. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press; 
Tilly, Charles, 1995, “Contentious Repertoires in Great Britain, 1758–1834,” p. 15–42 in Repertoires and 
Cycles of Collective Action, edited by Traugott, M. Durham, NC: Duke University Press as cited in Wang, 
D.J. and Soule, Sarah, “Tactical Innovation In Social Movements: The Effects of Peripheral and Multi-
Issue Protest,” American Sociological Review (April 29, 2016) Vol 81, Issue 3, p. 517 – 548: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122416644414. 
20 See also Clemens, Elisabeth S., 1993, “Organizational Repertoires and Institutional Change: Women’s 
Groups and the Transformation of American Politics, 1890–1920,” American Journal of Sociology 
98(4):755–98; Darnovsky, Marcy, Epstein, Barbara, Flacks, Richard, eds., 1995, Cultural Politics and 
Social Movements, Philadelphia: Temple University Press; Naples, Nancy A., 1992, “Activist Mothering: 
Cross-Generational Continuity in the Community Work of Women from Low-Income Urban 
Neighborhoods,” Gender & Society 6(3):441–63; Piven, Frances F., Cloward, Richard A., 1979, Poor 
People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail, New York: Vintage Books; Robnett, 
Belinda, 1996, “African-American Women in the Civil Rights Movement, 1954–1965: Gender, Leadership, 
and Micromobilization,” American Journal of Sociology 101(6):1661–93; Staggenborg, Suzanne, 1988, 
“The Consequences of Professionalization and Formalization in the Pro-choice Movement,” American 
Sociological Review 53(4):585–605 as cited in Wang and Soule, “Tactical Innovation,” p. 517-548. 
21 See Isaac, Larry, Christiansen, Lars, 2002, “How the Civil Rights Movement Revitalized Labor 
Militancy,” American Sociological Review 67(5):722–46; Minkoff, Debra C., 1997, “The Sequencing of 
Social Movements,” American Sociological Review 62(5):779–99; Mische, Ann, 2002, “Cross-Talk in 
Movements: Reconceiving the Culture-Network Link,” p. 258–80 in Social Movement Analysis: The 
Network Perspective, edited by Diani, M., McAdam, D. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press; Olzak, 
Susan, Uhrig, S. C. Noah, 2001, “The Ecology of Tactical Overlap in New Social Movements in West 
Germany,” American Sociological Review 66(5):694–718 as cited in Ibid. 
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Wood 2012).22  Certain protest tactics have been linked to the emergence of tactical 
innovation, but some of those same characteristics (i.e., use of new, combinations of old, 
or confrontational protest tactics) have also been linked to increased risk of protest 
violence by state-repression (Bromely and Shupe 1983; Davenport 2000; McAdam 1982; 
Wisler and Guigni 1999; and Earl 2003).23  From this, I would argue that tactical 
innovation, although linked to protest success, also increases the likelihood of protest 
repression/violence.  
The micro-situational explanation, from the emotional-dynamic theory, operates 
under the operational-assumption that for uncontrollable violence to be established, 
both/all-involved parties involved need to participate in its initiation (i.e., Theory P3: 
“dynamic interaction”), otherwise the emotional tension cannot break past the violence 
inhibition threshold (Collins 2008, 2009; Nassauer 2016).  Ratliff (2011) argues that 
collective violence emerges from the “dynamic interaction” of all available actors at the 
event (i.e., police, protesters, and counter-protesters).  As I alluded to in the previous 
paragraph, when it comes to the “dynamic interaction” explanation, police are usually the 
only side that can make the exception and initiate a violent-confrontation without the 
opposing side actively-participating.  When protesters initiate violence, police can either 
respond with repression or refuse to engage-physically, proving supportive of the 
“dynamic interaction” theory.  
 
 
 
                                               
22 Multi-issue protest is described by Wang and Soule (2016) as, “when protesters express multiple goals, 
principles, and identities typically associated with two or more dissimilar claims or movement groups.” 
23 Ratliff, “On the Stage of Change,” p. 14-15. 
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Macro-Contextual Theories 
The emphasis of path dependent theories is the timing of events in relation to one 
another.  In other words, an initial move toward one direction prompts continued 
movement in that direction while making it increasingly difficult to change directions as 
time goes on.  Historical institutionalists focus, in addition to timing and sequence, on 
feedback/interaction mechanisms,24 the mapping of actors’ pursuits of interests within the 
defined-processes of an institution, and what occurs when a single element/variable 
changes over time (Glenn 2004).  Path dependency focuses on explaining regime stability 
and growth and is largely associated with the work of Paul Pierson (1993, 2000).25  
Pierson (2000) examines the path dependent sequencing of political processes and argues 
that the temporal ordering significantly impacts the outcomes of events or processes.  
Path dependent analyses focus on the timing of events relative to one another because, as 
Pierson argues, the order of events and/or processes crucially impact outcomes.  He 
examines and lists three settings that are predisposed to positive feedback: self-
reinforcing sequences, event sequences (if occurrences are causally-linked), and 
                                               
24 Feeback mechanisms are srgued to work in three ways: (1) self-reinforcing; (2) “initial event backfire;” 
and (3) historical conjunctures per Hacker, J. S., 2002, The Divided Welfare State: The Battle Over Public 
and Private Benefits in America, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Skocpol, T., 1992, Protecting 
Soldiers and Mothers, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press; Orren, K. and Skowronek, S., 2001, 
‘What is Political Development?’, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association; and Lieberman, R. C., 1998, Shifting the Color Line: Race and the American Welfare State, 
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press as cited in Glenn, Brian J., “The Two Schools of American 
Political Development,” Political Studies Review (2004) Vol. 2, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University/Oxford University, p. 155-156: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-9299.2004.00005.x. 
25 See also Pierson, Paul, “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” Studies 
in American Political Development, Cambridge University Press, 27 Oct. 2000, 
www.cambridge.org/core/journals/studies-in-american-political-development/article/not-just-what-but-
when-timing-and-sequence-in-political-processes/E9741EE229E51B3676A062DAA1A608A1 as cited in 
Bridges, Amy, “Path Dependence, Sequence, and History,” Studies in American Political Development, 
Vol. 14 (Spring 2000), p. 109: 
https://static.cambridge.org/resource/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:binary:20170223065317329-
0411:S0898588X00213047:S0898588X00003047a.pdf. 
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conjunctures.26  Theories that utilize order and sequence recognize the necessity for 
concepts that identify pattern-diversities in order understand the “causal power of 
temporal connections among events.”  Pierson emphasizes the importance for researchers 
to know why, where, and how concepts come into play during temporal processes.27  
There is a focus on sequencing in political processes, that being the inquiry of a 
variable(s) value and the order in which they appeared.28  Pierson (2000) contends that 
path dependent analysis of historical developments in politics and processes, ordered in a 
temporal sequence of events, can assist in better understanding complex social dynamics.   
Chart 3: Macro-Context Theories 
Theory Name (T1) Author(s) Core Ideas 
T1: ‘Timing/Feedback’ 
Theory 
Glenn 2004; Pierson 1993, 
2000; Mettler and Sorelle 
2014; and Skocpol 1992. 
The occurrence and order of 
events affects the same 
aspects of future events. 
 
Aminzade (1992) argues theories of continuity and change that focus on order and 
sequence comprehend that the “causal power of temporal connections among events” 
requires concepts to identify the diversity of patterns found among temporally connected 
events.29  One such example is the historical process of US policing styles and how it can 
help illuminate why Ferguson and North Minneapolis reacted differently.  Each style can 
be categorized as either ‘negotiated management’ or ‘strategic incapacitation.’  Each 
response from law enforcement can be characterized by three main factors: degree of 
violence used, number of behaviors considered prohibited, and the level of 
                                               
26 See Pierson, Not Just What but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes, p. 74:   Conjunctures 
are prone to positive feedback when they involve the simultaneous occurrence of regularly unrelated 
sequences or the interruption of on-going sequences by unforeseen events. 
27 See Ibid., p. 72-92: Concepts needed for analysis of temporal processes are: path dependence; critical 
junctures; sequencing; events; time horizons; duration; timing; and unintended consequences. 
28 See Ibid., p. 73: he quotes Tilly (1984) from his work on sequencing, “when things happen within a 
sequence affects how they happen.”   
29 See footnote 11 on ‘required concepts.’ 
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communications between protesters and police (McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 
1998; and Gillham and Noakes 2007).  
Policy feedback theory looks at how political considerations affect policy analysis 
and how policies can affect critical aspects of governance.  The analysis of Theory T1 can 
assist in showing how certain policies affect democracy and illuminate “unintended 
consequences” that accompany certain policies.  Mettler and Sorelle (2014) argue that 
this theory highlights “how policies created previously affect the likelihood and form of 
future policy creation.”30  The feedback mechanisms used for theories on timing and 
sequence have applicability to insights on how public policies can, “through their design, 
resources, and implementation,” alter the behaviors and attitudes of the mass publics and 
political elite, as well as affect how policymaking institutions and interest groups evolve 
per Pierson 1993; Mettler and Soss 2004.31  Skocpol (1992) states how “policy, once 
enacted, restructures subsequent political processes.”32  Mettler and Sorelle (2014) argue 
that in contemporary politics new policies are generated through a system that inherently 
influences them based on existing policies.  Policy diffusion is an example of this where, 
“policymakers from one area learn from the experiences of policymakers elsewhere,” and 
how policymakers can be influenced by interest groups that pushed for changes in other 
areas.33   
  
                                               
30 See Mettler and Sorelle, “Policy Feedback Theory,” in Theories of Policy Process, ed. Paul Sabatier and 
Christopher Weible (New York: Avalon Publishing, 2014), p. 152.  
31 See Ibid., p. 152. 
32 See Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 58 
as cited in Mettler and Sorelle, “Policy Feedback,” p. 152.  
33 See Mettler and Sorelle, “Policy Feedback,” p. 152. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
It is well-documented what occurred during each respective protest in Ferguson, 
MO (August 2014) and North Minneapolis, MN (North Minneapolis, MN), but what has 
not been looked at are the specific differences in reactions to police violence as well as 
the reasons for these variations.  My exploratory study analyzes the possible explanations 
derived from seven violence-related theories to see how they illuminate the different 
reactions which took place in Ferguson in 2014 and North Minneapolis in 2015.  Below I 
discuss the sorts of evidence relevant to each theory’s analysis. 
Chart 4: Evidence and Micro-Context Theories 
Theory Name (C1, 2, 3) Applicable Evidence 
C1: ‘Ethnic Diversity’ Theory -Census data on ethnic diversity. 
 
C2: ‘Community History of Violence’ 
Theory 
-Public records and historical accounts on 
the experiences of community-level 
violence.  
 
C3: ‘Area/Policing Culture’ Theory 
-Public records and historical accounts on 
each area’s culture. 
-Government and media reports on each 
area’s policing culture prior to each 
incident.   
 
In applying Theory C1, archived and recent data sets from the US census gave 
detailed and thorough information regarding, among other facets, the ethnic diversity of 
Ferguson and North Minneapolis.  By analyzing the changes in ethnic demographics over 
time it becomes clear how long each area has been predominantly made up of minority 
citizens who regularly experience discriminatory police practices.  Theory C2 states that 
greater incidents of community violence increase the likelihood of future events 
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exhibiting violence.  Historical records of past-civil disturbances provide insights into 
areas which exhibit more violence.  Looking to the histories of each area illuminates the 
various trends of community-level violence that can occur and the later-effects they can 
bring.  Public records describing the culture of each area allows for Theory C3 to help 
illuminate why certain police practices (i.e., unlawful and discriminatory) were 
commonplace prior to each protest event.   
Chart 5:  Evidence and Police Practice and Protest Interaction Theories 
Theory Name (P1, 2, 3) Applicable Evidence 
 
P1: ‘Threat/Repression’ Theory 
-COPS “after-action” report(s) for Ferguson, 
MO & N. Minneapolis, MN with daily incident 
statements on protesters’ activities/tactics and 
officers’ responses. 
-News articles (accredited and local), 
interviews, and footage from social media on 
the protest incidents of both Ferguson, MO & 
North Minneapolis, MN. 
 
P2: ‘Tactical Innovation’ Theory 
-After Action Reports on protester tactics 
through the incidents in Ferguson, MO and N. 
Minneapolis, MN. 
-News reports and protester accounts of tactical 
choices and changes throughout the 
demonstrations for both incidents. 
-Live streams and social media coverage of the 
protests. 
P3: ‘Dynamic Interaction’ Theory -After Action incident reports on protester-
police confrontations throughout the 
demonstrations in Ferguson, MO and North 
Minneapolis, MN. 
-News reports and protester accounts on 
protester-police confrontations in both cases. 
 
The analysis of events with respect to Theory P1 utilizes a mix of incident 
statements and news/social media reports on the events of each protest to identify when 
law enforcement perceives protesters as threatening and when they decide to use 
repressive tactics in response to this.  The daily incident statements detail official reports 
on the activities of both protesters and law enforcement officers along a uniform 
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timeframe.  Local news and social media archives and streams are utilized as a means of 
double-checking the official reports on what and when protesters did that made them be 
viewed as threatening to the point of police-protesting violence.  Theory P2 similarly 
utilizes daily incident reports as well as local and social media’s resources but is focused 
on the emergence of either new or “novel” combinations of older protest tactics.  
Additionally, the incidents of tactical innovation can be analyzed on a macro-scale for 
each demonstration on the effect it had on the overall success of the protests.  Theory P3 
uses similar resources as the previous two theories but focuses on the violence that stems 
from interactions between protesters and police officers.  It also analyzes when certain 
actors (e.g., either protesters or police) attempt to initiate violent confrontations but fail 
due to a lack of effort on the other side.   
Theory T1 utilizes news reports and after-action assessments to analyze the events 
of Ferguson and North Minneapolis in coordination with previous events related to 
policing, protests, and BLM.  This allows for better illumination for how previous events 
may have impacted the outcomes of the cases detailed in this study, particularly with 
police practices.   
Chart 6: Evidence and Macro-Context Theories 
Theory Name (T1) Applicable Evidence 
 
T1: ‘Timing/Feedback’ Theory 
-Historical and official accounts of 
previous events temporally linked to 
police-protest practices, BLM protests, and 
government-sponsored police reforms. 
-Reports and accounts on police: degree of 
violence used by the police; number of 
behaviors considered prohibited; and level 
of communications. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
 
FERGUSON UNREST 
 
 
 
Introduction to Case Study 
The shooting of 18-year-old Michael Brown inspired not one but at least three 
‘waves’ of protest incidents, although my focus will be on the first incident.  The 17-day 
period of demonstrations contained repeated instances of lawful and unlawful protests as 
well as riotous behavior (e.g., looting and property destruction) which took place in and 
around Ferguson, MO in the months after the August 9th, 2014 fatal-shooting of Michael 
Brown by Officer Darren Wilson.  The timeframe of this first incident started just after 
the midday shooting on August 9th through midnight of August 25th (the day of the 
funeral).  Michael Brown, an unarmed black man, was shot six times in the back by white 
police officer Darren Wilson while having his hands raised in the air.  Emotional tensions 
rose immediately following the shooting incident as information being released on the 
shooting was delayed and as Michael Brown’s body remained for four and a half hours 
on the pavement where he died.34  Similar to other cases, the Ferguson PD (in addition to 
the regional response) was not expecting nor prepared for a long-term mass 
demonstration, and this was the primary reasoning behind initiating the Code 1000 plan.35  
The demonstrations started out peacefully but tensions were exacerbated by, among other 
                                               
34 The image of Michael Brown’s body on the pavement spread across social media, increasing the 
presence of people at the site of the shooting. 
35 The Code 1000 Plan is a law enforcement mutual aid contingency plan that mobilizes personnel and 
equipment within the St. Louis County to certain law enforcement authorities who do not think they have 
sufficient resources for dealing with an on-going crisis, 
(https://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/document%20library/police/oem/code%201000/code%201000
%20NOVEMBER%202015.pdf). 
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factors, paramilitary style equipment and use of aggressive tactics which many protesters 
viewed as a means of intimidation.   
What has become known as the ‘Ferguson Unrest’ was the culmination of a long-
strained relationship between the police and its St. Louis communities, aggressive protest 
policing tactics, and the incredible speed at which information and misinformation was 
spread through social media and then to national and local news platforms.  Out of the 
multiple investigations & reports issued concerning Ferguson, the DOJ’s investigation 
into the Ferguson Police Department (FPD) that shed considerable light concerning the 
history and culture of community-relations between the police department and the 
citizens they serve.36  The investigation was initiated on September 14, 2014 to reveal if 
there was unlawful conduct occurring in the FPD.37  The costs incurred by Ferguson from 
the subsequent rioting and looting of buildings, from the first incident, are estimated to 
total around $4.6 million dollars.  It should be noted that the second incident of protests, 
following the grand jury decision not to indict officer Darren Wilson, cost the city 
approximately another $20 million dollars.  These figures represent the initial cost to the 
city and did not account for the long-term costs associated with damage to businesses 
without proper insurance and loss of real estate values. 
 
Historical Context 
Contention between law enforcement and black communities is longstanding in 
United States history and the greater St. Louis metropolitan area of Missouri holds no 
                                               
36DOJ Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, p. 6.  
37 Note: “This investigation was initiated under the pattern-or-practice provision of the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d (“Safe Streets Act”), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (“Title VI”).” See Ibid., p.1.  
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exception in that regard.38  According to a Business Insider article, the St. Louis 
Metropolitan Area is the sixth most segregated in the United States.39  The demographic 
makeup of Ferguson has shifted considerably since the 1990s when a majority of 
residents were white.  The black population of Ferguson has grown, according to U.S. 
Census Bureau, from around 25% in 1990,40 to 52% in 2000,41 and up to 67% in 2010.42  
While these demographic changes have been more rapid for Ferguson, ‘white flight’ had 
impacting the United States, as well as the greater St. Louis area, since the 1940s and 
1950s.43  In the past 60 years St. Louis City has lost over 500,000 residents due to ‘white 
flight,’ while exurban areas in adjacent counties (e.g., St. Charles county) have grown 
considerably since the 1960s.44  According to maps composed by Colin Gordon showing 
the movement of specific ethnic groups over time in the St. Louis area using census date 
                                               
38 While Ferguson’s population may be two-thirds back, its’ police force only had 3 black officers out of 53 
and its top city officials were mostly all white when the ‘Ferguson Unrest’ occurred.  See Pamela Engel, 
“These Maps of St. Louis Segregation Are Depressing,” Business Insider, August 15, 2014, 
http://www.businessinsider.com/colin-gordon-maps-white-flight-in-st-louis-2014-8.   
39 See John R. Logan and Brian Stults. 2011. “The Persistence of Segregation in the Metropolis: New 
Findings from the 2010 Census” Census Brief prepared for Project US2010. 
http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010 as cited in Jacobs, Kiersz, and Lubin, “The 25 Most Segregated Cities in 
America,” Business Insider, November 23, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/most-segregated-cities-
in-america-2013-11?op=1 
40 See 1990 Census of Population General Population Characteristics Missouri, U.S. Census Bureau (Apr. 
1992), available at ftp://ftp2.census.gov/library/publications/1992/dec/cp-1-27.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 
2015) as cited in U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, 
(Washington DC, 2015), p. 6, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. 
41 See Race Alone or in Combination: 2000, U.S. Census Bureau (2000), available at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/ bkmk/table/1.0/en/DEC/00_SF1/QTP5/1600000US2923986 (last visited Feb. 
26, 2015) as cited in Ibid., p. 6. 
42 See 2010 Census, U.S. Census Bureau (2010), available at 
http://factfinder.census.gov/bkmk/table/1.0/en/DEC/10_SF1/QTP3/1600000US2923986 (last visited Feb. 
26, 2015) as cited in Ibid., p. 6. 
43 See Alana Semuels, “White Flight Never Ended,” The Atlantic, July 30, 2015, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/07/white-flight-alive-and-well/399980/.  
44 As black residents fled the city, white residents moved further out into the fringe-areas; St. Charles 
County is 90% white and has grown by 1200% since 1960.  See Malcolm Gay, “White Flight and White 
Power in St. Louis,” Time, August 13, 2014, http://time.com/3107729/michael-brown-shooting-ferguson-
missouri-white-flight/. 
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from 1940-2000,45 as black residents move into particular neighborhoods, whites move 
farther and farther away.  The populace of Ferguson, MO in recent decades has 
undoubtedly become more ethnically diverse: with 67.4% African American, 29.3% 
white, 0.5% Asian, 0.4% Native American, 0.4% other, and 2.0% from two or more 
ethnicities.     
A possibly overlooked factor regarding the community reactions to police 
violence may lay with America’s evolving system of gentrification and segregation.   
Glaeser and Vigdor (2012), among other scholars, argue that segregation between 
American neighborhoods has reached its lowest point in over a century.46  Although a 
new study from the American Sociological Review has found that, while segregation from 
neighborhood to neighborhood (i.e., micro-segregation) is declining, segregation from 
suburban communities to other suburban communities and segregation from cities to 
suburban communities (i.e., macro-segregation) is increasing.47  What this means is that 
while overall segregation in metro areas may be declining, “segregation between places 
(i.e., city-suburb or suburb-suburb) is rising” per Lichter 2015.  The Kershner Report 
noted two separate Americas: the black inner-city and white suburbs, but now American 
cities are becoming more diverse as certain suburbs become more segregated.  What this 
means is that Ferguson matches this new age evolution of American segregation in which 
cities are becoming more diverse while suburbs are becoming increasingly homogenous.   
                                               
45 See ‘White Flight’ maps as cited in Pamela Engel, “These Maps of St. Louis Segregation Are 
Depressing,” Business Insider, August 15, 2014, http://www.businessinsider.com/colin-gordon-maps-
white-flight-in-st-louis-2014-8.  
46 See Edward Glaeser and Jacob Vigdor, The End of the Segregated Century: Racial Separation in 
America’s Neighborhoods, 1890-2010, the Manhattan Institute’s Center for State and Local Leadership, 
2012, p. 1-26. 
47 See Lichter, “Toward a New Macro-Segregation? Decomposing Segregation within and between 
Metropolitan Cities and Suburbs,” American Sociological Review, 2015 as referenced in Alana Semuels, 
“White Flight Never Ended,” The Atlantic, July 30, 2015, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/07/white-flight-alive-and-well/399980/.  
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Narrative of Events 
Each day and night, Ferguson saw crowds of people (from small groups to full-on 
crowds of hundreds of people) flooding the streets in protest, with evenings having 
noticeably more people with pre-meditated criminal intentions (e.g., looting, arson, 
vandalism).  After Brown’s death on August 9, the report states48 crowds of 
approximately 200 people formed around the homicide scene on Canfield Drive.49  The 
crowds were described, from interviews with police officers after the incident, as “chaotic 
but not out of control,” although as time passed, the crowd became increasingly hostile 
with on-scene officers.50  As the crowds began to grow in the hundreds, law enforcement 
decided for Canfield Drive to be closed off to regular drivers.  Eventually the crowd 
began to push into the homicide scene, prompting a call for assistance from the canine 
unit.  Statements were taken from both FPD and St. Louis County PD officers detailing 
how unprecedented both the initial crowd’s behavior to the incident and the 
demonstrations which followed.51  With Brown’s body on the ground for multiple hours52 
and as additional emergency vehicles came on-scene, the levels of fear rose in the crowd 
of bystanders but as more people joined the crowd, bystanders became “increasingly 
                                               
48 Numbers of participants in crowds based on the COPS “assessment team’s interviews with police 
officers and reviews of relevant photographs and videos.” See COPS, Ferguson “After-Action,” p. 7. 
49 Ibid., p. 7. 
50 U.S. Department of Justice, Department of Justice Report Regarding the Criminal Investigation Into the 
Shooting Death of Michael Brown by Ferguson, Missouri, Police Officer Darren Wilson, memorandum of 
understanding, March 2015, http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_ of_michael_brown.pdf. 
51 After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 8. 
52 See David Hunn and Kim Bell, “Why Was Michael Brown’s Body Left There for Hours?” St. Louis 
Post-Dispatch, September 14, 2014, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/why-
wasmichael-brown-s-body-left-there-for-hours/article_0b73ec58-c6a1-516e-882f74d18a4246e0.html; 
Yvette Carnell, “Ferguson Police Defend Decision to Leave Michael Brown’s Body in the Street for 4 
Hours,” Breaking Brown, August 25, 2014, http://breakingbrown.com/2014/08/ferguson-police-defend-
decision-to-leave-michael-browns-body-in-the-street-for-4-hours/ as cited in After Action Report: 
Ferguson, p. 8.  
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abusive toward law enforcement.”53  During the time as police were processing the scene, 
there were three instances of gunfire “volleys” reported by officers to have originated 
from the crowd.54  It was at this point that the on-duty St. Louis County PD captain called 
in the Code 1000.55  After continued gunshots were reported behind the apartment 
complex, mutual aid under Code 2000, was requested by a St. Louis County PD 
sergeant.56  Two staging areas for police vehicles were set up: the first at Original Red’s 
BBQ (0.3 miles from the homicide scene) and the second on Glen Owen Drive (0.2 miles 
from the homicide scene).57  As the afternoon of day one continued, another group of 
approximately 150-200 protesters formed at Original Red’s BBQ58 (on West Florissant 
Avenue) and as the day progressed, crowds at both locations continued growing in 
participants.59  It is noted that the increase in participant numbers was due to the initial 
number of people gathered, “ongoing texting, social media posts, and the police 
activity.”60  It was almost 3 PM of August 9 when multiple gunshots were reported and 
from this the crowds became more and more hostile, as a result the Bearcat armored 
vehicle was deployed along with tactical officers of the St. Louis County PD dressed in 
                                               
53 From interviews with police officers as noted in Ibid., p. 8. 
54 Note: Reported gunfire from St. Louis County PD computer-aided dispatch (CAD) occurred at 12:57 
PM, 1:15 PM, 1:55 PM, and 2:15 PM. See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 8.  
55 Code 1000 is a mutual aid plan that allows for other agencies to assist in a situation. See Ibid., p. 5. 
56 Code 2000 is a part of the Code 1000 mutual aid plan.  See Ibid., p. 5. 
57 Canfield Drive goes west about 200 yards and turns into Windward Court for about another 300 yards to 
the west. At that point, Windward Court intersects with Glen Owen Drive—the second staging area—
where the only route out of the area is northbound. While it is possible to drive into Canfield Green 
Apartments via this route, it is far from ideal because the roads are narrow and wind through apartment 
buildings and residential areas. See Ibid., p. 9. 
58 See note: Original Red’s BBQ was a popular restaurant and became iconic as a staging area for both law 
enforcement and protesters throughout the assessment period because of its location on the corner of West 
Florissant Avenue and Canfield Drive. Original Red’s BBQ was burned down by rioters on November 24, 
2014, after the grand jury decision. As cited in Ibid., p. 9. 
59 Ibid., p. 11. 
60 Ibid., p. 9. 
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riot gear.61  Around 5 PM – 6 PM, officers recognized the need for greater assistance to 
deal with the increasing number of participants in the crowds.62  Media coverage, as well 
as posts from Twitter, continued to reiterate63 how long Brown’s body was allowed to 
remain on the street and, even after the body removal, this fact continued to fuel tensions 
into the evening.64  It was reported from interviews that on-scene officers did not fully 
understand the depth of emotional upset caused by Brown’s body lying on the street for 
four hours, or how negatively standard homicide scene protocols were being interpreted 
by the crowds.65  Officers assumed that once the homicide scene was cleared and the 
roads reopened, the crowds would wind down and come to an end, but this incident 
(again) proved to be an unprecedented one.66  The community’s desire for answers, and 
law enforcement’s inability to provide any information regarding the shooting, only 
fueled tensions and kept the crowds’ numbers active and growing.67  Reportedly, by 8:40 
PM, the size of the crowds increased to the point where police vehicles on Canfield Drive 
were completely surrounded by demonstrators.68  Around 9 PM, officers began leaving 
the staging areas as more people stayed on West Florissant Avenue while congregating 
around the site of the shooting (referred to as the vigil area) on Canfield Drive as well as 
                                               
61 Note: Bearcat arrived at approximately 2:43 PM and tactical officers arrived around 3:15 PM. See After 
Action Report: Ferguson, p. 10. 
62 Ibid., p. 10. 
63 See Gordon Coombes (@surrealintel), “Michael Brown’s Body Left in Street for Four Hours No 
Ambulance Instead SUV Picks Up His Dead Body. #Ferguson #OpKKK,” Twitter post, November 24, 
2014, 1:28 p.m., https://twitter.com/surrealintel/status/536994812235239424/photo/1 as cited in Ibid., p. 
10. 
64 The St. Louis County Police Department Investigation Report 14- 43984 shows that the shooting was 
reported at 12:02 p.m., and the St. Louis County PD homicide investigation after-action timeline shows that 
the body was removed by the St. Louis Livery Service at 4:00 p.m. as cited in Ibid., p. 10. 
65 Ibid., p. 10. 
66 See Defining Moments for Police Chiefs, Critical Issues in Policing Series (Washington, DC: Police 
Executive Research Forum, 2015), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/definingmoments.pdf as cited in 
Ibid., p. 11. 
67 Note: Canfield Drive, from West Florissant Avenue, was reopened at 7 PM. See Ibid., p. 11. 
68 Note: Demonstrators surrounding policing vehicles on Canfield Drive was interpreted by officers as 
threatening behavior to which officers were directed to go to the Glen Owen Drive staging area. See Ibid., 
p. 11. 
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out front of the Ferguson PD headquarters.69  Law enforcement officers reported that the 
first 12 hours of crowds were primarily made-up by local individuals with personal 
interest in the incident, those who witnessed part or all the incident, and/or those who 
were alerted from texts/social media.70   
The early morning of August 10 saw protesters dissipating and while officers 
predicted that an afternoon gathering would occur in addition to an evening vigil, they 
thought the demonstrations would come to an end that Sunday.71  It was on the second 
day that a press conference72 was held by St. Louis County PD Chief Belmar where he 
described some of the facts related to the officer-involved shooting of Mr. Brown.73  This 
day saw the formation of various groups at three sites: (1) near the vigil site on Canfield 
Drive; (2) on West Florissant Avenue near Original Red’s BBQ; and (3) in front of the 
FPD station on South Florissant Road.  This is reportedly when crowds swelled up to 
around 700-800 people and a change in dynamics occurred, shifting from people 
observing to demonstrating.74  Members of the crowds began chanting and, those on 
South Florissant Road, started to block the road by sitting in it.75  As the gatherings grew 
a Code 200076 was made, calling in assistance from the St. Louis Metropolitan PD 
                                               
69 Ibid., p. 11. 
70 Note: This includes the St. Louis County PD Intelligence Unit, the St. Louis Metropolitan PD 
Intelligence Unit, the St. Louis Fusion Center, and the Missouri Information Analysis Center. After Action 
Report: Ferguson, p. 11. 
71 Based on interviews with law enforcement officers. See Ibid., p. 11. 
72 See Thomas Christopher, “Full Press Conference Ferguson Police Shooting of Michael Brown,” 
YouTube, August 10, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zUXqPDT8hr4 as cited in Ibid., p. 11. 
73 Note: Chief Belmar announced that the investigation was being handled by St. Louis County PD upon 
request from FPD and how Brown assaulted an officer and struggled for his gun before the shooting 
incident but did not release the name of the involved-officer. See Ibid., p. 11. 
74 Note:  Crowd numbers ranged from 700-800 people, according to a Missouri State Highway Patrol 
commander.  
75 See Melanie Moon, “Police Keep Watch over Protesters in Ferguson,” FOX 2 Now, August 10, 2014. 
http://fox2now.com/2014/08/10/policekeep-watch-over-protesters-in-ferguson/ as cited in Ibid., p. 12. 
76 76 Code 2000 is a part of the Code 1000 mutual aid plan.  See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 5. 
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tactical unit.77  Into the evening of August 10, numbers continued to grow, and looting 
and property damage started to begin.78  In addition to windows of businesses being 
broken, members of the crowds eventually started throwing objects at police officers and 
their vehicles.  St. Louis County PD estimated the crowds peaked that night at 1000 
people.79  Law enforcement attempted to take control of the situation, and maintain 
officer safety, through deploying armored vehicles and canine units from multiple 
agencies, although these tactics were largely seen by protesters as aggressive.  Greater 
assistance was needed by St. Louis County PD and so SWAT teams from varying 
agencies80 were called on-scene around 10 PM.  Protesters were ordered to disperse and 
when the crowds remained, smoke cannisters were deployed but were reported to have 
little to no effect.  CS tear gas (2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile) was then deployed by 
the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, which was more effective in dispersing 
large numbers of people.81  Law enforcement began responding to calls of looting and 
burglary and, on August 10, a reported 30 businesses were looted.   
Into the morning of August 11 (day three), large crowds of protesters and looters 
remained active until 3:00 AM and 4:00 AM.82  This day saw the announcement of a 
separate investigation into the shooting incident led by US Attorney General, Eric H. 
                                               
77 Note: The St. Louis Metropolitan PD is not in the County of St. Louis and as such is not part of the 
county Code 1000 Plan; it responded based on a mutual aid agreement. See Ibid., p. 12. 
78 Note: Video evidence and interviews support how the QuikTrip convenience store on West Florissant 
Avenue was burned down as other businesses near Canfield Drive (e.g., Sam’s Meat Market) sustained 
losses from looting and property damage. See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 12. 
79 After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 12. 
80 Note: Assistance came from the St. Louis Metropolitan PD SWAT team, the Missouri Highway Patrol 
SWAT team, and the St. Charles County multijurisdictional SWAT team. See Ibid., p. 14. 
81 F.T. Fraunfelder, “Is CS Gas Dangerous? Current Evidence Suggests Not But Unanswered Questions 
Remain,” British Medical Journal, February 19, 2000, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1127513/. 
82 Ibid., p. 15. 
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Holder, Jr.83  At 6 PM, community members shared a joint-prayer for Brown as well as 
took part in peaceful demonstrations during a meeting put on by the NAACP.  Protests 
remained peaceful until the evening when demonstrators reportedly threw objects (e.g., 
bottles, rocks, Molotov cocktails, etc.) at officers as the mood of the gatherings turned 
aggressive and violent.  Eventually this led to the burning of business and other property 
damage to which law enforcement responded with attempts to disperse the crowd.  Law 
enforcement deployed armored vehicles, tear gas, PepperBall projectiles, bean bag 
rounds, and Stingerballs. 84   Protesters complained that the police response was too 
aggressive, but the owners of damaged businesses and homes criticized the police for 
responding too slowly to the violent demonstrations.  While others became more 
aggressive, and prompted police response, some protesters were able to maintain peaceful 
demonstrations.  While law enforcement cited the use of armored vehicles and tear gas 
for officer safety and the dispersal of criminals, many community members viewed it as 
“evidence of police militarization.”85  In addition to the widely criticized “military-style 
equipment and tactics” was the total lack of uniformity among the law enforcement 
agencies when it came to the ways demonstrators were arrested as well as treatment of 
those individuals post-arrest.86  Up to this point, the FPD had not released any 
                                               
83 “FBI Investigating Ferguson Police Shooting of Teen Michael Brown,” NBC News, August 11, 2014, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/ storyline/michael-brown-shooting/fbi-investigating-ferguson-policeshooting-
teen-michael-brown-n177761 as cited in Ibid., p. 15. 
84 See “Projectiles,” PepperBall, accessed May 18, 2015, http://www.pepperball.com/projectiles/; “12 
Gauge Ballistic Bean Bag Round,” Keep Shooting, accessed May 18, 2015, 
http://www.keepshooting.com/12-gaugeballistic-bean-bag-round.html; and “Stinger 32-Caliber Rubber 
Balls with Safety Clip,” Safariland Group, accessed May 18, 2015, 
http://www.safariland.com/stingerrubber-ball/stinger-32-caliber-rubber-balls-w-safety-clip-1152928. 
html#start=1 as cited in After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 16. 
85 Ibid., p. 16. 
86 Note: Example of differing arrests/treatment between the agencies involved in the “Ferguson Unrest:” 
FPD and the St. Anne PD jail and law enforcement that used the St. Louis County jail.  It is noted that 
while differing police procedures occurred, the primary difference of treatment was due to jail operations 
rather than police policy.  Ibid., p. 17. 
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information about the shooting or the officer’s identity, and this continued to fuel 
tensions.  That evening saw crowds grow past the numbers of previous nights (i.e., over 
800-1000 people)87 and from this came heightened media coverage, which led to 
increased numbers of protesters coming from the “St. Louis metropolitan area and 
beyond.”88  The overall pattern, up to that point, of the demonstrations was largely 
peaceful during the day, but it is noted that a majority of daytime demonstrators that were 
interviewed mentioned leaving as it got dark but before the violence started.89  There 
were noted changes in the dynamics and character of the protests.90 
Crowd control efforts for August 12 saw continued use of varying law 
enforcement agencies SWAT teams.91  The protest-policing tactics implemented under 
the St. Louis County PD became highly criticized and damaging due to images of the 
incident circulating through the media.  It was because of this that Chief Samuel Dotson, 
of the St. Louis Metropolitan PD, decided to withdraw his men from any continued 
protest response efforts aside from providing four officers to assist with “diverting traffic 
and keeping pedestrians and motorists safe.”92  It is worth noting that at 10am a group of 
                                               
87 Canfield Apartments became a “no-police zone,” allowing greater numbers of protesters and looters to 
assemble. It was from the growth of size and intensity that came from this disorder that garnered the event 
national attention. Ibid., p. 17. 
88 Ibid., p. 17. 
89 Community member interview with assessment team stated, “Once it got dark…it turned ugly.” See 
After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 17. 
90 Note: “Interviews with personnel from the four core agencies consistently noted the changes in the size 
and dynamics of the mass gatherings, particularly from day to night. Moreover, as days passed, the 
character of the demonstrators in the evening also seemed to change.” See Ibid., p. 17. 
91 On August 12, the Missouri State Highway Patrol deployed 26 day-shift troopers and 20 night-shift 
troopers as well as Troop C and F SWAT teams. On August 13, the agency deployed 16 day-shift troopers 
and 15 night-shift troopers plus the SWAT teams. Missouri State Highway Patrol Ferguson Response 
August 9–27, 2014 [PPT] (Jefferson City, MO: Missouri State Highway Patrol, 2014) as cited in Ibid., p. 
17. 
92 Jeremy Kohler, “St. Louis Police Chief Says He Does Not Support Militarized Tactics in Ferguson,” St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, August 14, 2014, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/st-louis-
police-chiefsays-he-does-not-support-militarized/article_b401feba-b49e-5b79-8926- 19481191726f.html. 
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protesters peacefully gathered at the headquarters of the St. Louis County PD.93  The St. 
Louis County PD and Missouri Highway Patrol maintained their tactical presence 
through a number of, widely-perceived, military-style methods of crowd control.94  As 
these military-style responses continued, the number of complaints and reports in the 
media95 increased as well as complaints from local residents.96  A no-fly zone was 
initiated following a St. Louis County PD report of a police helicopter being shot at the 
previous day,97  although some contend that it was a means of maintaining control over 
the various media outlet’s aircrafts.98  According to interviews conducted by the 
assessment team, protests during the fourth day remained largely peaceful, but through 
the evening of August 12 into the morning of August 13, the number of protesters from 
other regions arriving in Ferguson increased steadily.99  August 12 experienced a new 
                                               
93 Protesters had with them a list of demands regarding the investigation into Brown’s death.  The St. Louis 
County PD is headquartered out of Clayton, Missouri.  See Ibid., p. 17. 
94 Crowd control methods included: armored vehicles, long-range acoustic device (LRAD), tear gas, and 
less-lethal weapons. See “Public Safety/Law Enforcement, Homeland Security, Border Control, and More,” 
LRAD Corporation, accessed May 18, 2015, http://www.lradx.com/site/content/view/254/110 as cited in 
Ibid., p. 17-18. 
95 See Nick Wing, “Actual Military Veterans Say Cops in Ferguson Are Excessively Armed, Untrained 
Wannabes,” The Huffington Post, August 14, 2014, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/14/policemilitarization-ferguson_n_5678407.html as cited in After 
Action Report: Ferguson, p. 18. 
96 Resident complaints of the police response were primarily referencing how the police’s tear gas would 
waft into local neighborhoods.  For example, see Kollege Kidd, “Ferguson Police Fire Tear Gas and 
Rubber Bullets at ‘Mike Brown’ Protesters,” YouTube, August 12, 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ocfdfL2j2OU; Colleen Curry, “Ferguson Police Use Tear Gas While 
Again Clashing With Protesters,” ABC News, August 13, 2014, 
“http://abcnews.go.com/US/fergusonpolice-tear-gas-clashing-protesters/story?id=24957752. The police 
defend the use of tear gas at Jim Salter and Jim Suhr, “Police Defend Use of Tear Gas, Smoke at Protest,” 
WAVY.com, August 14, 2014, http://wavy.com/2014/08/14/protests-turn-violent-in-st-louis-suburb/ as 
cited in Ibid., p. 18. 
97 Denver Nicks, “FAA Implements No-Fly Zone in Ferguson Amid Unrest Over Killed Teen,” Time, 
August 12, 2014, http://time.com/3105035/ferguson-faa-no-fly-zone/. 
98 Note:  The no-fly zone was lifted on August 22. Jack Gillam and Joan Lowy, “FAA Approved No Fly 
Zone in Ferguson, Missouri, to Keep Media Away,” Northwest Herald, last updated November 2, 2014, 
http://www.nwherald.com/2014/11/02/ faa-approved-no-fly-zone-in-ferguson-missouri-to-keep-media-
away/ azabefv/. 
99 It was noted that a considerable number of protesters from away with prior-motivations for taking 
advantage of the situation arrived in Ferguson.  Ibid., p.18. 
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development of “hacktivists,”100 from the group Anonymous under what they called, 
‘Operation Ferguson,’101 which they targeted various municipal government and police 
agency websites, telephone lines, email servers, as well as employed other computer 
network intrusions that were linked with the identify theft of multiple officers (i.e., 
“doxing”).  The St. Louis County PD Communications Unit102 got hacked on August 13, 
according to interviews, and eventually the St. Louis County PD website experienced a 
distributed denial of service (DDoS)103 that disrupted full-service (e.g., webmail and 
smartphone access) for seven days (i.e., until August 19).104  On August 13, city officials 
from Ferguson requested for all vigils to be held during the daytime, to better mitigate the 
violence of previous nights, as well as for demonstrators to disperse before nighttime.105  
This was also the day when two reporters were arrested at a restaurant nearby the 
protests, only furthering the negative attention put towards police response tactics.106  
Interviews with officers and citizens described how the pattern of the protests remained 
consistent, with largely peaceful daytime protests followed by increasingly aggressive 
nighttime protests.107   
                                               
100 Alex Rogers, “Why Is Anonymous Involved in the Ferguson Protests?” Time, August 21, 2014, 
http://time.com/3148925/ ferguson-michael-brown-anonymous/. 
101 “Anonymous Operation Ferguson,” Anonymous, http://www.operationferguson.cf/. 
102 See Louise Boyle and Damien Gayle, “Anonymous-Hacked 911 Tapes Reveal St Louis police ‘First 
Heard About Michael Brown Shooting on the NEWS . . . and the Local Department Knew Nothing About 
It’,” Daily Mail, August 13, 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ news/article-2724304/Anonymous-hacks-
St-Louis-police-dispatchtapes-releases-calls-surrounding-cop-shooting-Michael-Brown.html 
103 Note: A DDoS attack is a malicious attempt to make a server or a network resource unavailable to users, 
usually by temporarily interrupting or suspending the services of a host connected to the Internet. For more 
information, see “What is a DDoS Attack?” Digital Attack Map, accessed May 2015, 
http://www.digitalattackmap.com/ understanding-ddos/ as cited in After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 19. 
104 Internal systems were back-up and running by 1am on August 14, but there was no internet, email, or 
access to the St. Louis County PD website. See Ibid., p. 19. 
105 Doug Stanglin, “Ferguson Asks Protests, Vigils Be Held during Day,” KSDK.com, August 18, 2014, 
http://www.ksdk.com/story/ news/local/2014/08/13/ferguson-asks-protests-vigils-be-held-
duringday/14000463/. 
106 “Reporters Arrested at Ferguson McDonald’s,” KSDK.com, August 18, 2014, 
http://www.ksdk.com/story/news/local/2014/08/13/2-reporters-arrested-at-ferguson-mcdonalds/14037723/. 
107 After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 19. 
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The numbers of protesters remained steady as the number of concerns increased 
throughout August 14,108 but after five days of demonstrations, it was perceived that the 
situation was not improving under the incident command of the St. Louis County PD.109  
A press conference was held in which Governor Jay Nixon designated, through executive 
order,110 the Missouri Highway Patrol as the agency in charge of the protest response 
with Captain Ronald S. Johnson as incident commander.111  Captain Johnson seemed to 
have a positive impact as he reached out proactively to members of the community and 
involved-groups.112  It is noted that Captain Johnson spoke at one of the vigils held in 
honor of Michael Brown113 and consistently allowed photographs to be taken with 
demonstrators.  While Captain Johnson’s efforts had positive effects for the community 
and demonstrators, his support towards protesters was negatively viewed and reportedly 
lowered morale among officers.114  
The next day, August 15, Ferguson PD Chief Jackson announced Darren Wilson 
as the involved-officer in Brown’s death and, against the advice of Missouri State 
Highway Patrol Capt. Johnson and St. Louis Count PD Chief Belmar, released video 
footage indicating Brown’s involvement in a convenience store robbery prior to his fatal 
                                               
108 Concerns held by local, county, and state political officials were due to continued property damage, “the 
potential for life-threatening circumstances, the images of disorder in Ferguson, and complaints about the 
police” which were being highlighted globally by news agencies and social media. Ibid., p. 20.  
109 Ibid., p. 20. 
110 Office of Missouri Governor Jay Nixon, “Executive Order 14-08,” August 16, 2014, 
https://governor.mo.gov/news/executive-orders/ executive-order-14-08. 
111 Office of Missouri Governor Jay Nixon, “Gov. Nixon Announces Missouri State Highway Patrol Will 
Take the Lead on Security Responsibilities in Ferguson,” news release, August 14, 2014, 
http://governor.mo.gov/ news/archive/gov-nixon-announces-missouri-state-highwaypatrol-will-take-lead-
security. 
112 Wesley Lowery, “With Highway Patrol, Hugs and Kisses Replace Tear Gas in Ferguson,” The 
Washington Post, August 15, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2014/08/14/withhighway-patrol-hugs-and-kisses-replace-tear-gas-in-ferguson/. 
113 Scott Neuman, “Capt. Ron Johnson: ‘I Am Sorry’ for Brown’s Death,” The Two-Way, NPR.org, August 
17, 2014, http://www.npr.org/ sections/thetwo-way/2014/08/17/341161117/capt-ron-johnson-i-amsorry-
for-browns-death. 
114 This is according to interviews with law enforcement officers. See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 21. 
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altercation with Officer Wilson.115  The report attributes this announcement by Jackson to 
the increase in protesters at the daily demonstrations and heightened emotional volatility 
during the evening demonstrations.116  Despite this, the daytime protests in front of the 
FPD remained nonviolent.  During this time, it was reported that multiple businesses and 
residents called-in complaints about “protesters blocking sidewalks, impeding entries into 
their businesses, and, in some cases, blocking the street.”117  Evening demonstrations saw 
increased numbers of lawful and unlawful protesters as well as the participants throwing 
Molotov cocktails and other objects at officers.  As a crowd gathered outside the store 
Mr. Brown allegedly robbed, Captain Johnson foresaw complications and decided to 
assist the store owner by moving the storeowner’s merchandise off-site.  The trouble 
predicted to occur at Ferguson Market and Liquor came about after Captain Johnson and 
his men, “lost the parking lot.”118  As officers stood on the other side of the street, a 
crowd formed and started looting the stores, and, because of the crowds of lawful 
protesters in between, Captain Johnson decided that engaging the looters would be too 
risky to the protesters’ safety and had his men stand down.119  Protesters became more 
aggressive and actively sought to exploit issues that would provoke police officers into 
responding violently.120  African American officers, in particular, were targeted, but 
eventually the targeting-situation become so bad that front-line officers had to be cycled 
                                               
115 Ibid., p. 21. 
116 See Tom McCarthy, “Ferguson Protests: Michael Brown Family Calls for Calm amid Criticism of Video 
Release—As It Happened,” The Guardian, August 15, 2014, http://www.theguardian. 
com/world/live/2014/aug/15/ferguson-police-officer-michael-browndarren-wilson as cited in Ibid., p. 22. 
117 Ibid., p. 22. 
118 From an interview with a state trooper.  See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 21. 
119 After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 21-22. 
120 See “Black and in Blue: A Ferguson Police Sergeant Reflects on a Tough Time,” St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, October 3, 2014, http://www.stltoday.com/ news/local/crime-and-courts/black-and-in-blue-a-
ferguson-police-sergeantreflects-on/article_b71556de-68b1-5666f-a6ce-cc02c01b8343.html. For a more 
recent video, see “Video Shows African American Officer Harassed by Protesters in Ferguson,” kmov.com, 
March 24, 2015, http://www.kmov.com/story/28695988/video-shows-african-american-officer-harassed-
by-protestors-in-ferguson as cited in Ibid., p. 23. 
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out “after 20-25 minutes… for their safety,” as a sergeant reported.121  Based on 
interviews with officers, law enforcement noticed an increased gang presence within the 
demonstrations for around three days.122  There were indications of a truce being made 
between gangs to participate in the demonstrations from intelligence units.  By August 
15, the gang presence started fading away, although, throughout this time, protesters 
continued to be primarily made-up of concerned citizens from communities around the 
St. Louis area.123    
August 16 (day seven) did not see noticeable changes in the numbers of 
protesters, aside from the slight changes related to Governor Nixon’s enactment of a daily 
curfew from midnight to 5 AM under his powers to declare a state of emergency.  August 
16 marked the first day of an informal incident command, under the Missouri Highway 
Patrol’s leadership, establishing uniform methods among the law enforcement agencies 
for responding to the demonstrations.124  This was initiated from an order Governor 
Nixon gave to all law enforcement as part of his declaring a state of emergency.  It is 
reported that the strategy for incident command changed this day, allowing for officers to 
integrate into the crowds and lessen the image of stand-offs between the police and 
protesters.125  To better achieve this, the strategy utilized deploying officers in teams and 
avoided having SWAT and tactical officers deployed until the situation deemed it 
necessary.126  Although, based on officer interviews, “the strategy for managing the 
demonstrations was continually changing.”127  To address the continuous problem of 
                                               
121 Ibid. 
122 After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 23. 
123 Ibid., p. 23. 
124 Ibid., p. 24. 
125 Ibid. 
126 This was aimed at having the effect of minimizing the visual presence of officers.  See Ibid., p. 24. 
127 Ibid., p. 25. 
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people in groups throwing objects at officers, the “keep moving” (or “five-second rule”) 
order was issued, and those who failed to disperse were arrested.128  It was noted that 
crowds used vehicles to block the roadway during the evening demonstrations.  There 
was a reported seven people arrested for failure to disperse the first night of the curfew.   
At around 12:15 AM on August 17, 150 demonstrators were reported to have 
remained active despite orders from law enforcement to disperse.  The group moved 
towards Original Red’s BBQ, down West Florissant Avenue, where they eventually 
blocked off the street for about an hour (from 12:23 AM to 1:30 AM).129  Like the 
previous evening, after curfew went to effect at 12 AM, another seven people were 
arrested for failure to disperse by the Missouri State Highway Patrol, and this became the 
regular pattern for evenings that followed.130  Around 7:30 PM, an aggressive crowd of 
almost a thousand was reported to have assembled near West Florissant Avenue, then 
looted several businesses over the next four hours, and was followed by a few hundred 
members of the crowd later attempting to overrun a command post.131  The curfew was 
found to be ineffective by most officials132 and was replaced the following day when the 
governor133 called in the Missouri National Guard.134  Even though the National Guard 
                                               
128 Ibid., p. 25. 
129 After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 25. 
130 Accounts from media, citizens, and law enforcement found the protests similar from previous days; i.e., 
peaceful in the day and aggressive in the night. See Ibid., p. 25-26. 
131 After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 26. 
132 Note: Curfew was ineffective because instead of it preempting the nightly violence that typically 
happened after midnight, the intense-violence merely shifted to happening right before the start of the 
curfew. Ibid. 
133 See Office of Missouri Governor Jay Nixon, “Executive Order 14-09,” August 18, 2014, 
https://governor.mo.gov/news/executive-orders/ executive-order-14-09 as cited in Ibid., p. 26. 
134 Note: Even though the curfew ended, police still demanded protesters disperse around midnight. See 
Monica Davey, John Eligon, and Alan Blinder, “National Guard Troops Fail to Quell Disorder,” The New 
York Times, August 19, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/us/ferguson-missouri-protests.html. 
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had no involvement with crowd control efforts, their presence had mixed emotions.135  
August 18 saw multiple large crowds assemble (numbers in the hundreds which ranged 
throughout the day), starting in the afternoon at a QuikTrip and McDonalds parking 
lot.136  The ambiguity of the “keep moving” order prompted a court case to be filed on 
August 18 that claimed the order violated free speech and due process rights.137, 138  That 
evening saw incidents including the blockage of streets and sidewalks, objects being 
thrown at officers, businesses suffering property damage, as well as a large fight 
(between demonstrators) breaking out.139  After 5 PM, protesters started the march down 
West Florissant Avenue, as gunshots were fired from the crowd and objects thrown at 
officers.  The police response consisted of SWAT units and multiple uses of tear gas, but 
even so, the Original Red’s BBQ was reported to be on fire around 11:30 PM.140      
An early press conference was held on August 19 where Captain Johnson 
commented on the increased number of disorderly activities141 and police responses from 
the night before into the early hours of the morning.142  Additionally, officers came under 
“heavy gunfire” on West Florissant Avenue and Canfield Drive and multiple shots143 
                                               
135 Some saw the National Guard positively in the added protection to businesses and people but were also 
seen as “an escalation of the military presence.” See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 26. 
136 It was during this time that officers again issued the “keep moving” order, as noted from Aug. 16. 
137 See Abdullah v. County of St. Louis, Missouri, et al., U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, 
Eastern Division, Case 4:14CV1436 CDP, http://www.aclu-
mo.org/files/1914/1262/7344/Abdullah_Preliminary_ Injunction.pdf as cited in Ibid., p. 27. 
138 Note: On October 6, 2014, the judge enjoined the police from using the “keep moving” but expressly 
noted that the decision did not prevent police from making arrests under the Missouri unlawful assembly 
and failure to disperse statutes when the facts and circumstances met the elements of those statutes. See 
Ibid., p. 27. 
139 Ibid., p. 27. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Note: August 19 had protesters throwing rocks and other objects at officers, and one officer was 
reported injured because of this.  31 people were arrested, with some coming from states as far away as 
New York.  See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 28. 
142 See “Transcript: Captain Ron Johnson Press Conference in Ferguson, Missouri, 2:21 a.m. 2014-08-19,” 
Lincoln Madison, August 19, 2014, http://lincmad.blogspot.com/2014/08/transcript-capt-ron-johnsonpress-
conf.html as cited in After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 27-28. 
143 Note: Shots were reported at 10:01 PM, 10:36 PM, 10:44 PM, 11:05 PM, and 1:14 AM. Ibid., p. 28. 
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were later reported by the St. Louis Metropolitan PD.  Another concern addressed at the 
press conference was, “how some members of the media were physically positioning 
themselves in relation to the police and protesters.”  Captain Johnson asked for members 
of the media to “keep clear of the roads” and for “them to be careful in their reporting.”144  
The Missouri State Highway Patrol reported that for the evenings of August 19 and 
August 20, protest groups decreased in size (to around 150 people) and that levels of 
emotional volatility and tension also decreased.145  The night of August 20 was calmer 
than previous nights, despite  experiencing the injury of three officers, multiple threats on 
the lives of police officers, and 47 arrested for “various illegal acts.”  The decline in 
tensions could be seen in the relaxed posture held by police officers and community 
leaders, and some attribute this to the arrival of US Attorney General Eric Holder.146     
Gov. Nixon officially started the process of withdrawing National Guard troops 
from Ferguson on August 21, allowing for an increased sense of calm among community 
leaders and demonstrators.147  The crowds were more peaceful but in the evening seven 
officers were injured and while armed persons were reported, no shots fired were noted 
that evening.  August 21 saw about 300, largely peaceful, demonstrators around West 
Florissant Avenue and Canfield Drive.  Law enforcement took notice of 12 members of a 
                                               
144 Lindsey Bever, “Media Making Up the Mob: Journalists amid Protesters in Ferguson, Missouri,” The 
Washington Post, August 20, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/ 
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145 Ibid., p. 28. 
146 See also Alan Blinder and Campbell Robertson, “As Tension Eases on Ferguson’s Streets, Focus Turns 
to Investigation,” The New York Times, August 20, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/us/ferguson-missouri-protests.html?_r=0. 
147 See Office of Missouri Governor Jay Nixon, “Governor Nixon Orders the Missouri National Guard to 
Begin Systematically Withdrawing from the City of Ferguson,” news release, August 21, 2014, 
https://governor.mo.gov/news/archive/gov-nixon-orders-missourinational-guard-begin-systematically-
withdrawing-city-ferguson as cited in After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 28. 
36 
 
local motorcycle club who took to the streets with the aim of “keeping the peace.”148  
Once again, West Florissant Avenue was closed-off due to protester activity.  August 22 
was considered a lull by police officers, with zero protest-related arrests, and even fewer 
demonstrators than the day before.149  A sense of normalcy had come back to 
Ferguson,150 but officers recognized that the demonstrations were not over yet.  This was 
seen in the continued anger and list of demands151 from demonstrators to government 
officials (e.g., “de-escalation of police militarization”).152  As West Florissant Avenue re-
opened, there was a noticeable decrease in the number of protesters at both demonstration 
sites.153  The NAACP hosted another peaceful protest154 on August 23 and, despite six 
arrests, the demonstrations continue to be relatively calm.155  It is worth noting that 
officers assisted a nonprofit in delivering food to residents of the Canfield and 
Northwinds apartment complexes.156  Even though six people were arrested, the evening 
of August 23 did not experience random gunshots, objects being thrown at officers, or 
                                               
148 See David McCormack, “All-Black ‘Outcast MC’ Biker Club Patrolling the Streets of Ferguson in a Bid 
to Help Keep the Peace after Ten Nights of Unrest,” DailyMail.com, August 19, 2014, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2729449/All-black-Outcast-MC-bikerclub-patrolling-streets-
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150 Yamiche Alcindor, Larry Copeland, and Gary Strauss, “Calm Restored in Ferguson, Support Builds for 
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151 See Matt Sledge and Emily Kassie, “Ferguson Protesters Have Some Demands (VIDEO),” The 
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152 See Durrie Bouscaren, “A Group of Ferguson Protesters Releases List of Demands, Calls for National 
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153 Note: Demonstration sites included: West Florissant Avenue and at the Ferguson PD. See Ibid., p. 29. 
154 Note: The NAACP urged DOJ to hold FPD and Officer Wilson accountable for Mr. Brown’s 
death. Ibid., p. 29. 
155 See “NAACP Holds Peaceful Protest in Ferguson,” KSDK.com, August 23, 2015, 
http://www.ksdk.com/videos/news/local/2014/08/23/14509145/ as cited in Ibid., p. 29. 
156 Note:  The nonprofit, Crisis Aid International, was assisted by officers going door to door, delivering 
food. See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. 29.  
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any deployment of smoke or tear gas to disperse protesters.  This calm continued, 157 and 
the size of protesters continued to decrease from August 24 through August 25.  Even as 
events wound down and normalcy seemed to return to the streets, West Florissant 
Avenue continued to have small groups of activists.  Overnight, six additional people 
were arrested for, primarily, failure to disperse.  Daily protests still occurred at the 
Ferguson PD.  Michael Brown Sr. asked demonstrators to refrain from protesting during 
the day of son’s funeral.158  On Monday, August 25, there were no protests or arrests 
related to the demonstrations in Ferguson.159  Overall, Ferguson experienced no “loss of 
life or serious injury to protesters” due to police responses over the 17 day period, despite 
236 demonstration-related arrests being made (36 felonies and 200 misdemeanors).160   
The cause of the protests and the response by law enforcement drew international 
attention (e.g., Amnesty International America), inspired four separate Justice 
Department reports, and helped continue the nationwide protest-movement against the 
continued deaths of unarmed black Americans by the hands of (white) police officers.  At 
the time when federal reports were being made, there were no ‘best practices’ established 
for handling a mass demonstration like the one Ferguson experienced, making the 
findings and lessons important for police agencies all over the country.  The first of the 
reports covered the shooting death of Michael Brown in which it concluded that Officer 
Darren Wilson was justified in his actions and did not violate Brown’s rights.  This 
announcement inspired further demonstrations out of anger and solidarity in support of 
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158 See Eyder Peralta, “At Michael Brown’s Funeral, A Call for a Day of Reckoning,” NPR.org, August 25, 
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Michael Brown’s memory & family.  The next was an after-action assessment report 
from the DOJ’s office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) which found 
the police’s heavy-handed response to the protest to be problematic in its attempts to 
contain the demonstrations, among other reasons, for lacking de-escalation training and 
efforts as well as being reactive rather than proactive in their aggressive-handling of the 
mass demonstrations.  This tactical response by the police is credited with limiting the 
options for dealing with protesters without use of force and escalating the situation out of 
the possibility for positive negotiations, leading to the violence and destruction most 
Americans remembered from the news that August of 2014.  The following narrative 
describes key events and turning points.   
Aside from casting a light on Ferguson’s unpleasant policing history, the DOJ 
investigation into the FPD delved deep into the heart of Ferguson’s issues with how the 
city was being run. The investigation found the city’s police and court institutions to have 
widespread racial biases, for example, African Americans were found to account for 90% 
of police officers’ reported use-of-force.161  The city of Ferguson had a specific focus on 
generating municipal revenue, to which it used the FPD, the Ferguson Municipal Court, 
and the office of the City Prosecuting Attorney.  While the sources of community distrust 
are disputed, the investigation team found that distrust in FPD is longstanding and a 
result of the manner laws are enforced (i.e., “unnecessarily aggressive… at times 
unlawful policing…”).162  Even though Ferguson’s population is 67% black, 93% of all 
                                               
161 See Ibid. as cited in “Ferguson unrest: From shooting to nationwide protests,” British Broadcast 
Company - News, August 10, 2015: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-30193354. 
162 Police & City Officials, and some Ferguson residents, contend the ‘public outcry’ originates from 
“outside agitators” and not reflective of “real Ferguson residents.”  This runs counter to the facts cited in 
the report, Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department, March 4, 2015, p. 5.  
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people arrested are black.163  The investigation found that FPD used to employ “modest 
community policing efforts” but it had, in recent years prior, moved away from such 
practices, thus widening the pre-existing division between FPD and the predominantly 
black communities.  In its place was an aggressive policing style, supported by the city, 
that routinely violated multiple constitutional rights and was found to use discriminatory 
intent adversely against African Americans.164  This focus on generating revenue 
impacted law enforcement practices and culture.  The investigation was critical of all 
municipal institutions for systematically targeting (primarily poor) black Americans with 
unreasonably high court fines and fees, among other discriminatory practices, designed to 
increase the cities revenue.  From 2014 to 2015 there was a million dollar increase in 
revenue from public-safety fines, making up approximately 12% of the total budget, as 
referenced in the Bloomberg News report from the City’s Finance Director.  Despite this 
still being up in the air, it is anticipated the revenue from fines and fees will make up 
almost a quarter of the city’s budget (i.e., $3.09 million out of $13.26 million).  In 
addition to such a high focus on fines and the city’s orders to the FPD to aggressively 
focus on municipal violations Ferguson has some of the most expensive fines and tickets 
out of the surrounding municipalities.165    
Out of all the reports which followed this incident, the COPS after-action 
assessment was the most informative when it came to the problems faced by the police 
and community during the ‘unrest,’ and reviewed their actions in an independent, 
                                               
163 African Americans made up 96% of people arrested for outstanding municipal warrants as well as 95% 
of the “manner of walking in roadway” charges. See “Ferguson unrest,” BBC-News.  
164 Note: FPD law enforcement officials were found to have a pattern and practice of violating the First, 
Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See DOJ Civil Rights Division, Investigation of the Ferguson Police 
Department, p. 1.   
165 One example is how the cost for “Weeds/Tall Grass” charges in Ferguson can range from $77-$102 
while other municipalities have this charge, at its lowest, around $5.  
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objective, and candid manner.166  While there were over 50 law enforcement agencies 
who assisted in the response to Ferguson, four core Missouri law enforcement agencies 
made up the primary focus of this review: the St. Louis County PD, the Missouri State 
Highway Patrol, the St. Louis Metropolitan PD, and the Ferguson PD.  This assessment 
brought forward 48 findings and over 100 lessons applicable to law enforcement agencies 
around the country.  It additionally found six themes that permeated all actions of the 
police response: inconsistent leadership, failure to understand endemic problems in the 
community, a reactive rather than proactive strategy, inadequate communication and 
information sharing, use of ineffective and inappropriate strategies and tactics, and a lack 
of law enforcement response continuity.  During the mass demonstrations associated with 
the ’Ferguson Unrest,’ the immediate response from involved law enforcement agencies 
was aggressive and reactive in nature, prompting domestic and international criticism.   
A similar paramilitary response on the part of the police was seen again in what 
has become known as the ‘Baltimore Uprising,’ and this was found to be equally 
ineffective to promoting peace and nonviolence during the demonstrations following the 
arrest & death of Freddie Gray in April of 2015 (just prior to the release of the COPS 
Ferguson After-Action Assessment in May).  Should the events in Baltimore that spring 
had happened a month or two later, the lessons identified from the ‘Ferguson Unrest’ 
could have positively impacted, and possibly avoided, the levels of unlawful violence and 
property destruction that the community experienced. 
  
                                               
166 US DOJ Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, After-Action Assessment of the Police 
Response to the 2014 Demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri, (Washington DC, 2015), https://ric-zai-
inc.com/Publications/cops-p317-pub.pdf.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
 
NORTH MINNEAPOLIS OCCUPATION 
 
 
 
Introduction to Case Study 
The shooting of Jamar Clark on November 15, 2015 inspired 18 days of protests 
in the form of occupying the space in front of and around the Fourth Precinct.  
Immediately following the shooting incident, crowds of witnesses and community 
members lined the streets as emotional tensions rose.167  Jamar Clark was shot in the 
head168 just a few blocks from the MPD Fourth Precinct and it was on the lawn and street 
in front of this police station, and briefly inside its front vestibule for the first three days, 
where most of the organized demonstrations took place in the form of an occupation.  
Police reform demonstrations spread into the street and the surrounding neighborhood for 
an 18-day period which lasted from November 15th to December 3rd, 2015.  In addition 
to demonstrations, there were open fires, noisy gatherings, and encampments throughout 
the 18 days, many of which violated municipal use-of-space ordinances.  Despite the 
clear violations of municipal law, there no arrests made by MPD, and it was not until the 
early hours of December 3rd when they finally broke down the encampments in front of 
the 4th Precinct in a peaceful manner.  Even though the situation ended peacefully, the 
city of Minneapolis still incurred costs around $1.15 million dollars, with a majority of 
that total (around $1 million dollars) was for police overtime. 
                                               
167 Emotional tensions were heightened by the uncertainty of whether Jamar Clark was handcuffed when he 
was shot, and it was not until November 17 that it was reported that he was not handcuffed. See After 
Action Report: MPD, p. 16. 
168 Jamar Clark was shot in the head during the altercation but did not die until days after being in a coma. 
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The protesters had mixed behaviors of primarily peaceful demonstrations during 
the day followed by violent protest behavior at night (e.g., objects thrown at officers, 
verbal harassment).  Despite the suddenness of the protest situation, city and police 
officials waited no time to call for an independent investigation into the shooting incident 
of Jamar Clark by the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehensions (BCA).169  The 
following day, Mayor Hodges contacted and requested for an additional independent 
investigation into the shooting to be conducted by the Civil Rights Division of the 
USDOJ as well as the Minnesota U.S. Attorney.170  Despite the “measured” response, the 
After Action Report identified 36 findings and 71 recommendations. 
 
Historical Context 
The North Minneapolis Occupation of November 2015 was an event unlike the 
any before seen by police or city officials,171 but was still an event a long time in the 
making.  Like the Plymouth Riots of 1967,172 the occupation was fueled by decades of 
racially-charged tensions between minority community members and local government 
combined with discriminatory police practices.  North Minneapolis, MN has always been 
the area where minority citizens have been pressured to live, but even so, the population 
                                               
169 The independent investigation into the shooting was called for by Mayor Hodges at 9 AM of the 
incident-day. See “BCA Called To Investigate Officer-Involved Shooting in North Mpls.,” CBS Minnesota, 
November 15, 2015, http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/11/15/mplsofficer-shoots-wounds-suspect-
following-struggle/ as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 12. 
170 See The full content of the mayor’s letter can be viewed at “34 Adults, 8 Juveniles Arrested as Jamar 
Clark Protest Shuts Down I-94,” Fox 9, last modified November 17, 2015, 
http://www.fox9.com/news/50123489-story as cited in Ibid., p. 14. 
171 There had been previous incidents of civil disturbances in the mid-1960s all the way up to 2002, but the 
city had not previously encountered an occupation-style protest of a police precinct.  
172 See Susan Marks, “July, 1967: Civil unrest on Plymouth Avenue,” MinnPost (July 24, 2017): 
https://www.minnpost.com/mnopedia/2017/07/july-1967-civil-unrest-plymouth-avenue.  
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of N. Minneapolis has historically been mostly white.173  It was not until after the ‘white 
flight’ of the 1960s that African Americans largely settled down in N. Minneapolis.  Ever 
since the 1950s, Minneapolis has been ethnically and culturally diversifying itself 
through an influx of immigrants from countries in Asia and Africa (e.g., Somalia, 
Ethiopia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia).  N. Minneapolis is certainly more ethnically diverse 
than it was 60 years ago, with the most recent census data (2012-2016) showing the 
population to be around 57% black, 17% Asian, 13% white, 9% Hispanic, and 4% of two 
or more ethnicities.174 
Minneapolis, Minnesota has long been known for its strong economy, 
affordability, and liberal politics.  The latter-19th century saw the population of 
Minneapolis increase from an influx of predominantly Scandinavian immigrants.  While 
white citizens could take advantage of the city’s opportunities, the small black population 
of Minneapolis was blocked from owning downtown homes, businesses, or enjoying 
employment from milling or finance-related jobs.175  The COPS After-Assessment 
Report cites from the Hennepin County Library that, historically, minority citizens of 
Minneapolis have only been accepted in North Minneapolis.176  North Minneapolis (the 
                                               
173 North Minneapolis went from being around 75% white, 16% black, 2% Hispanic, 2% Native American, 
1% Asian, and 4% of two or more races in 1980 to being 43% black, 30% white, 13% Asian, 8% Hispanic, 
1% Native American, and 5% as other or of two or more races in 2010.   
174 Data derived from US Census Bureau by Wilder Research, “Near-North Neighborhood,” Minnesota 
Compass, 2018: http://www.mncompass.org/profiles/neighborhoods/minneapolis/near-north. 
175 See United States. Department of Justice, Community Oriented Policing Services, COPS Office, 
Maintaining First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North Minneapolis: An After-Action Assessment 
of the Police Response to Protests, Demonstrations, and Occupation of the Minneapolis Police 
Department's Fourth Precinct, by Frank Straub, Hassan Aden, Jeffrey Brown, Ben Gorban, Rodney 
Monroe, and Jennifer Zeunik, March 20, 2017, p. 8:  https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0836-
pub.pdf. 
176 “A History of Minneapolis: 20th Century Growth and Diversity,” Hennepin County Library, archive 
from April 21, 2012, accessed November 10, 2016, 
http://web.archive.org/web/20120421143305/http://www.hclib.org/pub/search/ 
specialcollections/mplshistory/?id=26 as cited in United States. Department of Justice, Community 
Oriented Policing Services, COPS Office, Maintaining First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North 
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‘north side’) has continued to be the focal point of racial and socio-economic division for 
over fifty years and brings with it a rich history of civil unrest.  In the 1960s, fueled by 
decades of marginalization, there was a group of approximately 50 youth which 
vandalized and looted ‘north side’ businesses.  The following year of 1967, an event 
known as the “Plymouth Riot” occurred in which another group of youths set fire to 
multiple buildings on Plymouth Avenue, and unlike the previous year, the group did not 
disperse once law enforcement arrived on scene.  This riot lasted for three days and only 
ended once 150 National Guard troops were deployed, but none of the dozen stores on 
Plymouth Ave remained.177   
Following the civil unrest of the mid-1960s, the city made efforts to try and 
rebuild the area by donating an abandoned building to be opened as a community center, 
The Way Opportunities Unlimited, Inc. (The Way).  The Way served the ‘northside’ 
community through providing educational services to local youth and it became a symbol 
of black empowerment and self-determination for those often forgot by city leadership.  It 
should be noted that The Way building burned down following the Plymouth Riot of 
1967.178  In 1989, the organization that owned The Way lost its funding and the city took 
possession of the building and turned it into the Fourth Precinct police station.  The 
                                                                                                                                            
Minneapolis: An After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to Protests, Demonstrations, and 
Occupation of the Minneapolis Police Department's Fourth Precinct, by Frank Straub, Hassan Aden, 
Jeffrey Brown, Ben Gorban, Rodney Monroe, and Jennifer Zeunik, March 20, 2017, https://ric-zai-
inc.com/Publications/cops-w0836-pub.pdf. 
177 Camille Venee Maddox, ‘The Way Opportunities Unlimited, Inc.’: A Movement for Black Equality in 
Minneapolis, MN 1966-1970 (honors thesis, Emory University, 2013), 
https://etd.library.emory.edu/view/record/pid/emory:d6v0d as cited in US DOJ, COPS Office, Maintaining 
First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North Minneapolis: An After-Action Assessment of the Police 
Response to Protests, Demonstrations, and Occupation of the Minneapolis Police Department's Fourth 
Precinct, p. 9. 
178 In 1966, a group of 50 youth vandalized and looted multiple Plymouth Avenue businesses in North 
Minneapolis.  The following year saw a similar incident known as the “Plymouth Riot,” where groups of 
youth set fire to buildings on Plymouth Avenue, but this incident lasted three days and the groups did not 
disperse as they had the previous year when law enforcement arrived.   
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symbolism and community-history of this building cuts deep into the contemporary 
issues North Minneapolis residents have with their law enforcement.  While it was 
acknowledged to be well-intentioned by some community members, the conversion of 
The Way into a police station was seen by some as a source of resentment and 
contention.  It is directly referenced in the report, an interview with a BLM Minneapolis 
organizer on the symbolism of ‘black revolutionary love’ held by The Way building.179  
In 2002 there was an incident of community violence in North Minneapolis that followed 
the non-lethal shooting of a young boy as police officers conducted a drug raid on the 
suspected house.180  It was reported that residents took out their anger by shouting and 
throwing objects at police officers, and eventually through assaulting multiple news 
reporters and damaging their vehicles.  The occupation protest of 2015 was driven by 
many of the same problems faced by the community in the 1960s: high rates of 
unemployment, poverty, and criminal activity.  
 
Narrative of Events 
The November 15, 2015 shooting-incident of Jamar Clark in North Minneapolis 
inspired an 18-day long occupation-style protest,181 the likes the Minneapolis Police 
Department (MPD) had never before encountered.182  It garnered immediate local 
attention, even though the incident took place around 1 AM, as witnesses and other 
                                               
179 Jessie Hausman, “The Faces of the Fourth Precinct Protest,” Twin Cities Daily Planet, December 17, 
2015, http://www.tcdailyplanet.net/fourth-precinct-protestprofiles/ as cited in Ibid., p. 9. 
180 William Brandt, “Police shooting leads to violent protest,” Minnesota Public Radio, Aug. 23, 2002 
available at: http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/200208/23_williamsb_policemelee/. 
181 David A. Graham, “How Did Jamar Clark Die?” The Atlantic, November 18, 2015, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/jamar-clark-is-the-next-great-police-brutality-
controversy/416418/. 
182 Straub et al., COPS, North Minneapolis After-Action Assessment, (2017) p. 1-85, https://ric-zai-
inc.com/Publications/cops-w0836-pub.pdf. 
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community members lined Plymouth Avenue North.183  One of the reasons this event 
drew so many people’s attentions was due to the how it was not clear if Jamar Clark was 
handcuffed as he was shot, although it was later discovered he was not.184  It was reported 
that 100-200 people started a march from the homicide scene two blocks down to the 
Fourth Precinct station.185  It should be noted that the demonstrators who believed Clark 
was handcuffed called for prosecution of the involved-officers.  By 3 PM another 
demonstration was organized, through social media, by BLM Minneapolis and the 
Minneapolis chapter of the NAACP, that followed the same path marching as the 
previous demonstration had.  At this point demonstrators linked arms and formed a half- 
mile “No Cop Zone,”186 and as they chanted 12 BLM chapter members entered and 
started an occupation inside of the precinct’s front vestibule.  They listed five demands187 
be met before they would leave the vestibule.  Those in the occupation also refused to 
attend the community meeting and listening session organized by the Urban League that 
evening, and many who attended described it as tense and shared similar sentiments to 
the remarks made by the active-protesters.188   After the meeting, attendees and other 
community members joined the demonstration outside the police station, reportedly 
                                               
183 See N. Minneapolis Background section on the history of Plymouth Avenue being a past site for civil 
unrest in the 1960s (i.e., the Plymouth Riot of 1967) from After-Action Report: MPD. 
184 Report of the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office Regarding the Shooting Death of Jamar Clark on 
November 15, 2015 (Minneapolis, MN: Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, 2016), 
http://www.hennepinattorney.org/~/media/Attorney/NEWS/2016/jamar-clark-case/report-of-hennepin-
county-attorney-regarding-death-of-jamarclark-3-30-16.pdf?la=en.3 as cited in Ibid., p. 9.   
Note: Coroner did not find the bruises on Clark’s wrists that would have occurred if he was handcuffed at 
the time of the shooting. 
185 Ibid., p. 12. 
186 See “Police Precinct Occupied after Jamar Clark is ‘Executed’ while Handcuffed,” Unicorn Riot, 
November 15, 2016, http://www.unicornriot.ninja/?p=2747. 
187 BLM Vestibule Demands: (1) viewing the footage from the incident; (2) an independent investigation; 
(3) media coverage of eye witness testimony (4) community oversight of police with full-disciplinary 
power; and (5) a residency requirement for MPD officers.  See After Action Report: MPD, p. 12. 
188 Patience Zalanga, “Tense Community Meeting After Police Kill Minneapolis Man,” The Uptake, 
November 18, 2015, http://theuptake.org/2015/11/18/tensecommunity-meeting-in-wake-of-police-killing-
minneapolis-man/. 
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bringing the number of protesters up to 300-400.189 The first night saw protesters throw 
rocks, bottles, and other objects as they surrounded the station, verbally harassed the 
police officers, blocked the police vehicle exits, and destroyed police equipment (e.g., 
police cruisers tires slashed and windows of cruisers and the station itself were 
broken/damaged).190 
November 16 had a range of approximately 50-300 people throughout the day 
protesting with a reported 300 people who marched towards downtown, up the I-94 W 
ramp, and blocked five-lanes of the highway by linking arms to create another “No Cop 
Zone.”191  This day’s protesters continued the call for having the video released as well as 
for the prosecution of the involved officers and were made up by members of “BLM, the 
NAACP Minneapolis, the Black Liberation Project, and unaffiliated community 
members.”192  According to the report, that evening, between 9:30 PM and 10:30 PM, 
protesters threw bottles and bricks over the fence targeting the officers and vehicles in the 
back parking lot.193  On November 17 tents and canopies were set up as demonstrators 
continued to occupy the front lawn,194 but no significant changes in protester numbers 
were reported.  That evening (from 5:30 PM to 7:30 PM), 10 members of Jamar Clark’s 
family and 6 BLM members met with Mayor Betsey Hodges and relayed a few 
requests195 that, if met, could put an end to the occupation.196  The mayor agreed to the 
                                               
189 Janee Harteau, “18 Days Outside the Minneapolis Police Department’s 4th Precinct,” PowerPoint 
presentation to Major Cities Chiefs Association, May 25, 2016. Reviewed by assessment team May–
November 2016. 
190 After Action Report: MPD, p. 13. 
191 “#Justice4Jamar Camp Expands; Minneapolis Residents Block I-94; Unicorn Riot Reporter & 40+ 
Others Arrested,” Unicorn Riot, November 16, 2015, http://www. unicornriot.ninja/?p=2775. 
192 Ibid. as cited in After-Action Report: MPD, p. 14. 
193 See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by 
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in After-Action Report: MPD, p. 15. 
194 Ibid., p. 16. 
195 Requests to Mayor Hodges from Clark family and BLM: (1) for she (the mayor) to arrange culturally 
appropriate grief counseling for members of the family and community; (2) convey to the BCA and 
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first two but could not give a final decision regarding the third.197  During the day of 
November 17, the protesters remained largely peaceful but by nighttime they had started 
throwing rocks, bricks, and other debris over the precinct walls.198  In addition to this, 
they made multiple attempts to breach the fences and barricades put up that morning and 
damaged multiple vehicles belonging to residents of the neighborhood.199  Two of the 
men occupying the vestibule attempted to gain entry in to the precinct lobby but were 
unsuccessful.  November 18 saw the erection of another five tents and two canopies for 
food/commissary.200  The Urban League held a press conference with members of BLM 
and the Clark family to officially demand for the release of the video, but the Clark 
family also reached out to the demonstrators to maintain peaceful protests.201  Following 
the press conference, the mayor met privately with two members of the family and six 
from BLM to relay that she had kept her promises with the first two demands and wanted 
an end to the occupation, but when she said she would not be able to publicly call for the 
release of the video, the meeting ended.202  The vestibule was cleared at 2 PM and was 
widely viewed by protesters as a “disproportionate [and militarized] response to their—to 
                                                                                                                                            
USDOJ representatives the family’s wish to view the video privately; and (3) for her to publicly call for 
any related-videos to be released. 
196 After Action Report: MPD, p. 16. 
197 See footnote 42. 
198 See Bill Sorem and Michael McIntee, “Barricaded Police Station Symbol of Separate but Unequal 
Minneapolis,” The Uptake, December 9, 2015, http://theuptake. org/2015/12/09/barricaded-police-station-
symbol-of-separate-but-unequalminneapolis/ as cited in Ibid., p. 16. 
199 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses 
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team 
April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., 16. 
200 Ibid., p. 17. 
201 See Kate Raddatz, “Jamar Clark’s Family Calls For Peaceful Protest, Justice,” CBS Minnesota, 
November 18, 2015, http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/11/18/jamarclarks-family-calls-for-peaceful-
protest-justice/ as cited in Ibid., p. 17. 
202 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses 
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team 
April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 17. 
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that point, largely non-violent—occupation.”203  The dynamics of the demonstrators 
changed from there on out and that evening, the occupation saw one of its most violence 
points.  It was from this point on that the situation-response effort expanded to the entire 
department instead of just the Fourth Precinct.204  It should be noted that three city 
councilmembers205 went to the occupation to participate and show support with their 
constituents.  The evening of November 18 experienced a growth in the number of 
intensity of protesters and small numbers of protesters used “Molotov cocktails, bottles of 
gasoline, and large cement bricks” to throw over the fencing and walls.  Additionally, 
protesters cut portions of fencing and barbed wire on the station’s west gate and 
destroyed a monitoring camera set up by the police for the protest.206  During the violence 
of the evening, 13 protesters marched to the mayor’s house to voice their displeasure for 
how the vestibule-situation was handled.  It was surprising when the mayor’s husband 
answered the door, explained that the mayor had not been there, and invited them in to 
talk for around 10 minutes.207   
Later in the evening of November 19, a vigil was held for Clark in which the 
mayor attended.  This was also the day when three city councilmembers and the U.S. 
Representative that represents the Minneapolis area joined representatives of BLM and 
religious leaders for the continued call to release the video(s) pertaining the shooting of 
                                               
203 See Assessment team interview with community member, May 5, 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 18. 
204 See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by 
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 18.  
205 Note: Councilmembers: Lisa Bender (Ward 10), Alondra Cano (Ward 9), and Cam Gordon (Ward 2).  
206 See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by 
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 18. 
207 See “Protestors: We Knocked On The Mayor’s Door, Her Husband Let Us In,” CBS Minnesota, 
November 19, 2015, http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/11/19/ protesters-we-knocked-on-the-mayors-
door-her-husband-let-us-in/ as cited in Ibid., p. 18. 
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Clark.208  Despite the continued verbal harassment, November 19 was much calmer than 
the previous night and did not have any reported significant changes in the number of 
demonstrators, as was true for the number of participants on November 20.209  Although 
there was an incident involving protesters threatening officers with lit Molotov cocktails 
as well as an intoxicated women who attempted to drive through the back fence.  While it 
remained unclear whether the intoxicated women had been involved with the protest, 
these events on November 20 created and raised tensions between demonstrators.210  A 
vigil was held at 4 PM with the NAACP national president as the guest of honor, who 
reinforced the importance of maintaining peaceful protests as they fought for justice.211  
While physical violence ended that day, verbal harassment of officers (particularly those 
who were African American) did not.212  This marked the most peaceful night of the 
occupation yet.  The mornings and early afternoons of November 21 and 22 both 
experienced around 50 protesters outside the precinct station.  Those numbers increased 
to approximately 200 each evening, but no arrests or violence was reported.213  A meeting 
between the governor, US Representative, and BLM representatives took place to discuss 
ending the occupation.  Following the meeting, the governor called for a USDOJ 
investigation into any civil rights violations that may have occurred during the 
                                               
208 See “Ellison, Mpls. Councilmembers Stand With BLM In Quest For Video Release,” CBS Minnesota, 
November 19, 2015, http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/11/19/ ellison-mpls-councilmembers-stand-with-
blm-in-quest-for-video-release/ as cited in Ibid., p. 21. 
209 After Action Report: MPD, p. 20-23. 
210 See Bill Keller, “SUV Rams Fourth Precinct Gate, 2 Arrested for Jamar Clark Vandalism,” Fox 9, 
November 20, 2015, http://www.fox9.com/news/51959667-story as cited in Ibid., p. 22. 
211 See “Protestors Hold Candlelight Vigil For Jamar Clark At 4th Precinct,” CBS Minnesota, November 
20, 2015, http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/11/20/policeon-alert-at-4th-precinct-candlelit-vigil-for-
jamar-clark/ as cited in Ibid., p. 22. 
212 See Libor Jany, “Minneapolis’ Black Police Officers Walk a Cultural Tightrope,” Star Tribune, March 
5, 2016, http://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-black-policeofficers-walk-a-cultural-
tightrope/371135461/ as cited in Ibid. 
213 See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by 
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p.24-25. 
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occupation214 and called for special legislation aimed at addressing the racial disparities 
felt in North Minneapolis & the state of Minnesota.215  On November 22, a meeting was 
held between the Mayor’s Office and BLM in which they agreed to end the occupation 
on Tuesday, November 24.216 
During the day, a meeting took place with city officials and demonstrators whose 
goal was to finalize a timeline for ending the occupation, but an agreement could not be 
reached.  No major changes in numbers occurred on November 23, but tensions were 
raised after a slow police response to the non-lethal shooting of five demonstrators by a 
small group of “supposed” white supremacists.217  The counter-protesters, (unofficially) 
identified by a BLM organizer and the Minneapolis NAACP chapter president as white 
supremacists, were three white men and one woman who were wearing ski-masks while 
live streaming arguments they were having with protesters.  Eventually a small group of 
protesters pursued them away from the area outside the MPD 4th Precinct building before 
one of them, later identified as Allen Scarsella, pulled out a gun and fired into the 
dissipating group of protesters.  This act of violence committed against BLM protesters 
inspired greater support from existing and new members as a means of fighting against 
the efforts of (perceived) white supremacists.218  The day after the shooting, November 
24, the communications chair of the Minneapolis NAACP went on CNN for an interview 
                                               
214 See Phil Helsel, “Minnesota Governor Calls for Federal Review of Police Actions,” NBC News, 
November 22, 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/minnesotagovernor-calls-federal-review-
police-actions-n467746 as cited in Ibid., p. 24. 
215 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses 
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team 
April–November 2016 as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 24. 
216 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses 
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team 
April–November 2016 as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 24. 
217 After Action Report: MPD, p. 26. 
218 Kutz, “How Black Lives Matter came back stronger after white supremacist attacks,” Waging 
Nonviolence, (November 30, 2015): https://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/black-lives-matter-came-back-
stronger-white-supremacist-attacks/. 
52 
 
and claimed that the “MPD was facilitating injustices”219 and “purposely [delayed] their 
response to the shooting victims.”220  There was supposed to be a meeting between 
officials and activists to put the occupation to an immediate end, but certain occupation 
leaders refused to attend and the protests continued.221  By 2 PM that day, it is reported 
that 1000 protesters marched from the Fourth Precinct to City Hall, again, demanding the 
videos of the shooting be released.222  During this time, an additional 500 protesters 
remained at the Fourth Precinct for a concert.223  When protesters returned from the 
march some became violent, throwing projectiles at officers and squad cars.224   
Jamar Clark’s funeral was held on November 25 at the Shiloh Temple 
International Ministries between 10 AM - 1 PM, and had hundreds of people in 
attendance.225  The president of the Urban League of Minneapolis spoke at the funeral, 
reiterating the points made by the US Representative and Clark’s family to end the 
occupation.226  These notions were countered by another pastor who promoted a rally 
happening after the funeral, how the video had not been released yet, and that there were 
                                               
219 See “Minnesota NAACP Leader ‘Raeisha Williams’ Claims Police Are Behind The Shootings Of 
Black! 2015,” YouTube, published November 24, 2015, https://www. 
youtube.com/watch?v=pvzqKzKdn54 as cited in COPS, Minneapolis After-Action, p. 27. 
220 See “BLM: Fourth Precinct Occupation Will Continue Despite Shootings,” CBS Minnesota, November 
24, 2015, http://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2015/11/24/blmfourth-precinct-occupation-will-continue-despite-
shootings/ as cited in Ibid., p. 27. 
221 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses 
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team 
April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 27. 
222 See Mary Lynn Smith and Claude Peck, “Five people were shot near Black Lives Matter protest site,” 
StarTribune, November 24, 2015, http://www.startribune.com/severalpeople-were-shot-near-black-lives-
matter-protest-site/353121881/ as cited in Ibid., p. 27. 
223 See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by 
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 28. 
224 See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by 
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 28. 
225 See “Funeral for Jamar Clark draws hundreds of Minneapolis mourners as protests against police 
continue,” New York Daily News, November 25, 2015, http:// 
www.nydailynews.com/news/national/jamar-clark-funeral-draws-hundredsminneapolis-mourners-article-
1.2447107 as cited in Ibid., p. 29. 
226 Ibid. 
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still people who wanted to fight for the justice Clark deserved.227  After the funeral, 
approximately 100 protesters returned to the Fourth Precinct.228  Some leaders of the 
protests started a call for more social services aimed at assisting those who came to the 
occupation out of necessity for food and shelter.  There were also trainings, speak-outs, 
and concerts held by protest leaders which all had a supply of food.229  It was at this point 
in the occupation that the demographics of the demonstrators became increasingly 
diverse, with many newcomers arriving from outside North Minneapolis.  Thanksgiving 
Day saw 100 protesters put on a “Blacksgiving” celebration which rejected the historical 
underpinnings of violence and injustice associated with Thanksgiving.230  Community 
members of North Minneapolis came out to donate heater, tents, and traditional 
Thanksgiving food to the demonstrators.231  A meeting was held Thanksgiving Day 
between the mayor, with the negotiation of terms assisted by USDOJ CRS personnel, and 
the presidents of the NAACP and Minnesota chapters.  The terms agreed to by everyone 
was the removal of three large tents the next day by 8 AM.232 
By 8 AM the November 27, the three agreed-upon tents were not removed, 
although no significant police activity was reported aside from a large thrown rock that 
broke a window on the west side of the precinct.233  Through the mediation of two CRS 
                                               
227 See Assessment team interview with community member, May 4, 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 29. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Ibid. 
230 See “#BlacksGiving,” Facebook event hosted by Black Lives Matter Minneapolis, November 26, 2015, 
https://www.facebook.com/events/1506059879687832/ as cited in Ibid., p. 31. 
231 See Beatrice Dupuy and Liz Sawyer, “Black Lives Matter Protesters Gather for Thanksgiving Feast,” 
StarTribune, November 27, 2015, http://www.startribune.com/ black-lives-matter-protesters-prepare-for-
thanksgiving-day-feast/354949271/#1 as cited in Ibid., p. 31. 
232 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses 
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team 
April–November 2016 as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 31 
233 See Incident Action Plan: 4th Precinct Security Detail 11/25/2015 1600 to 11/26/2015 1600 
(Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team August–
November 2016 as cited In Ibid., 32. 
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representatives, the mayor and her Chief of Staff met with the NAACP Minneapolis and 
Minnesota chapter presidents to discuss the “police reform and equity” items of 
NAACP’s agenda in exchange for the encampments’ fires being put out.234  November 27 
saw a general decline in the number of protesters at the occupation, with around 40 
during the day and only 20 overnight.235  This is partially due to a combined number of 
80 protesters demonstrating at two other events that day.236  On November 28, there was 
a reported 80 protesters during the day with approximately 10-15 that stayed overnight.  
The mayor and the presidents of both NAACPS chapters participated in eight hours of 
negotiations with regards to the removal of ordinance-violating fire pits.  She suggested 
acquisitioning a legal permit for the demonstrators to bring their own heaters to use in the 
precinct parking lot across the street.237  The negotiations ended when the fires had not 
put out.   No major changes occurred the next day, November 29, but BLM negotiators 
did release a list of demands238 in which, among others, demanded the occupation be 
allowed to continue through December.239  Through CRS representatives, the mayor 
continued her efforts to negotiate an end for the occupation, but when all BLM demands 
                                               
234 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses 
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team 
April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 32. 
235 See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2015). Reviewed by 
assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 32. 
236 Note: A group of 50 protesters went to march downtown to advocate raising the minimum wage, and the 
other group of 30 went to participate at the “Solidarity with the Northside” march on Minneapolis’ south 
side to the Third Precinct.  See “Timeline of Events” (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 
2015). Reviewed by assessment team April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 32. 
237 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses 
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team 
April–November 2016 as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 33. 
238 Other demands include: “That Minnesota law be changed to enhance civilian review of police 
departments; changes to Minneapolis’ contract with the Federation; that prosecutors charge those arrested 
in connection with the shooting of the five demonstrators with terrorism; a federal investigation into the 
shootings of the demonstrators; and that charges for all involved in blocking I-94 W be dropped. See Ibid., 
p. 34. 
239 See “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses 
to Protestor Requests,” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team 
April–November 2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 34. 
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could not be met, the meeting ended.240  While there was no significant police activity 
reported on November 30, “the mayor, US Representative, a Minnesota Dept. of Human 
Rights executive, and multiple former and current elected city councilmembers” stood 
together in a call for an end to the occupation.241  With growing efforts from certain 
community members and government officials to end the occupation, BLM and the 
NAACP chapter president for Minneapolis responded by doubling-down, refusing to 
leave until the videos were released.  As rumors of an “imminent” police raid aimed at 
ending the occupation circulated,242 tensions rose as physical fortifications were made to 
the camp (i.e., “more permanent and robust structures”).243   
MPD planned on removing the occupation’s encampment at 4 AM on the 
morning of December 1, but it was called off after the plan got leaked.244  No major 
protest incidents occurred on December 1 aside from the 30-35 remaining protesters and 
the group of clergy and BLM members who marched to city hall at 4 PM to demand the 
release of the videos.245  The governor called out on protesters to end the occupation and 
to “look at the bigger picture and rebuild the community together.”246  It is notable that 
the four men involved with the shooting of five protesters were charged.  One with five 
                                               
240 Ibid. 
241 See Mayor Betsy Hodges statement, “A Message from the Community to End the Occupation,” posted 
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counts of second-degree assault and one count of second-degree rioting, and the 
remaining three each got one count of second-degree rioting.247  The divide on whether to 
end the occupation between the Clark family and the demonstrators continued to widen 
as December 2 progressed.  Traditional faith leaders called for the occupation to end but 
emerging community leaders, largely BLM, continued their refusal to leave until the 
video was released.248  The number of protesters remained the same as MPD finalized 
their plans to end the occupation and clear the encampment the next morning. 249  Early in 
the morning of December 3 (at 3:45 AM) a combination of officers, city crews, 
firefighters, and private contractors cleared the encampment, opened the road, and gave 
35 people orders to disperse.250  While the occupation ended, protesters moved to City 
Hall to continue conveying the message that the protests would continue.251  This paper 
turns now to examining the extent to which the theories regarding violence and protest 
illuminate the differences between the events of Ferguson and North Minneapolis.  
The balancing act for law enforcement in upholding First Amendment rights and 
public safety has become even more difficult given the heightened tensions surrounding 
criminal justice reform protests and the greater scrutiny put on them by their community 
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members as well as the local and national media outlets.  This balance becomes even 
more difficult when law enforcement is faced with new and unique situations in which 
demonstrators defy prior-expectations by employing new and novel re-combinations of 
older protest tactics.252   
  
                                               
252 New or novel re-combinations of older protest tactics are a means of tactical innovation emerging. See 
Wang and Soule (2016). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
Micro-Contextual Findings 
Ethnic Diversity (C1) 
DiPasquale and Glaeser 1998 note a connection between a higher incidence and 
intensity of riots and the community-level variable of ethnic-diversity.  Both Ferguson, 
MO and N. Minneapolis, MN have become more ethnically diverse since the first few 
decades of ‘white flight,’ but North Minneapolis, MN has been steadily diversifying its 
demographics beyond margins of ‘black and white,’ with more recent influxes of 
Hispanics, multi-ethnic people, and immigrants from a variety of African and Asian 
countries.  Based on ethnic-diversity, this theory would expect a higher chance of 
violence and riots to occur in North Minneapolis rather than in Ferguson.  Despite this, 
the incidence and intensity of violence and rioting were reportedly much higher in 
Ferguson (2014) than they were in North Minneapolis (2015).  I would argue that North 
Minneapolis would have exhibited greater violence, and possibly riots, if the only factor 
involved was ethnic-diversity.  While ethnic-diversity has some role in understanding 
community-violence, it alone cannot explain the differences between Ferguson and North 
Minneapolis in how they reacted to police violence.  
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Chart 7: Findings and Micro-Context Theories 
Theory Name (C1, 2, 3) Findings 
C1: ‘Ethnic Diversity’ Theory -Ferguson, MO has become more 
ethnically-diverse. 
-N. Minneapolis has become more 
ethnically-diverse. 
C2: ‘Community History of Violence’ 
Theory 
-Ferguson and St. Louis, MO do not have 
much history of community violence. 
-N. Minneapolis has a long history of 
community violence. 
C3: ‘Area/Policing Culture’ Theory -Ferguson had a culture of aggressive and 
discriminatory policing against African 
Americans. 
-North Minneapolis had a policing culture 
of professionalism yet it still exhibited a 
sub-culture of policing discrimination 
against African Americans/minority 
citizens. 
-Ferguson was found to have high degrees 
of violence, large number of behaviors 
considered prohibited, and low levels of 
communication. 
-North Minneapolis was found to have low 
degrees of violence, small number of 
behaviors considered prohibited, and higher 
levels of communication. 
 
Prior History of Community Violence (C2) 
 Olzak, Shanahan, and McEeaney 1996 argue that a prior-history of community-
violence is associated with an increased likelihood of community-violence occurring in 
the future.  Ferguson, MO is a suburb whose racial demographics have shifted heavily in 
the past 20 years, from predominantly white to black, and incidentally has not endured a 
“rich” history of community-level violence.  Unlike places like 1960s Detroit, MI and 
Newark, NJ, the midwestern region of St. Louis, MO never experienced any major 
incidents of racially-charged civil unrest or rioting up until 2014.  North Minneapolis, 
MN (the “Northside”) has long history of being the only area where minority citizens are 
accepted and from this, it comes without surprise that, it has experienced its share of 
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community violence.  The ‘Prior-History of Community Violence’ theory contends that 
the likelihood of community-level violence would be higher in North Minneapolis, MN 
than in Ferguson, MO.  The 17 days of mass demonstrations in Ferguson (2014) 
exhibited greater levels of community-level violence than in North Minneapolis (2015) 
during the 18 days of occupation and protests.   
Because of Ferguson’s lacking history of community-level violence, police were 
caught off-guard to a lack of precedence that allowed for such high levels of protester and 
policing violence to occur compared to other cities around the United States which 
largely protested peacefully.253  Racial-disparities had fueled tensions between FPD and 
the community members for decades and Ferguson had not experienced any release of 
that tension through previous incidents of community-level violence.  This could have led 
to the initially-aggressive and surprising nature of the Ferguson crowds and 
demonstrators.  The FPD was unprepared to deal with the mass demonstrations, in part, 
because of the community’s lack of violent demonstrations within the previous 20 years, 
which would have provided actionable-precedence for law enforcement.254  This 
procedural unpreparedness mixed with the increasingly-aggressive nature of the 
demonstrations prompted a reactive and repressive response from law enforcement (i.e., 
aggressive arrest tactics, military-style equipment, use of canines).   
For the same reasons, I would argue that the North Minneapolis, MN protests 
remained peaceful on a community-level scale of violence (i.e., because they had prior-
experience with community-level demonstrations).  While MPD initially underestimated 
                                               
253 An example of this was seen when protests in NYC, following the death of Eric Garner, remained 
peaceful but protests in Berkeley turned violent multiple days in a row. 
254 One of the law enforcement supervisors, interviewed by the assessment team, was quoted saying, “In 
over 20 years of working here, this crowd was unlike anything I had ever seen.  See After Action Report: 
Ferguson, p. 7-8.  
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the strength and duration of the protests, they were better suited to deal with the protests, 
in part, because of their past experiences dealing with mass demonstrations.  While there 
was violent behavior exhibited during the November 2015 Minneapolis 4th Precinct 
Occupation protest because a confrontation was not made (i.e., the spark that ignites 
violence) and violent behavior was not established (i.e., rioting/looting did not occur), 
North Minneapolis has a lower probability for the occurrence of annual protests (i.e., 
commemorating events around Jamar Clark’s death) from turning into riots.  The effect 
of an initial riot greatly increases the chance for future violence but if efforts can be 
altered into capitalizing on pre-existing solution(s) (e.g., reforming policing policies, 
improving community relations) to assist in preventing the start of violent behavior in 
BLM-affiliated protests, there is potential for minimizing the likelihood for the 
recurrence of riots and the many costs which they bring. 
 
Past Law Enforcement Practices (C3) 
The context of each locations’ law enforcement practices and relationship to their 
communities prior to each incident may illuminate the difference in reactions to police 
violence between Ferguson, MO and North Minneapolis, MN.  The overarching cultures 
of an area or state can additionally help explain the different reactions to police.  Missouri 
is a border-state between the North and South, long referred to as the “Gateway to the 
West,” and it is from this that has allowed for the varying cultures and traditions which 
have continually fed racial tensions in the part of America.  There are two primary 
Missourian cultures, one more reflective of a slave-state (i.e., the Ozarks) and one 
62 
 
reflective of a northern-state (i.e., the big cities of Missouri).255  The Ozarks spread from 
the Arkansas border all the way up into the southern suburbs of St. Louis.256  While there 
is a strong culture of anti-black sentiment, certain parts of Missouri (i.e., Kansas City, 
MO during the Civil Rights Movement) have had an equally long history of African 
American resistance to those sentiments.257  Even when areas of Missouri seem accepting 
of others,258 there is a discomfort felt by locals when the discussion of racism arises.  This 
has been attributed to a popular sentiment among locals that if issues of race are not 
discussed, they will eventually go away.  This aspect of Missourian culture greatly 
reflects onto their law enforcement and helps illuminate why tensions went on for so 
long, why black residents of Ferguson were so quick to start protesting, and why the 
police response was so reactive and aggressive.  There were no established best practices 
for handling the “Ferguson Unrest” at the time, so it follows logically that they would 
respond to anti-police protests in the similar manner (i.e., aggressive policing utilizing 
military-style equipment and tactics) which started them in the first place (i.e., aggressive 
use-of-force leading to officer involved shooting). 
Minnesota culture derives primarily from the Scandinavian and German heritage, 
consisting of good manners, strong family ties, as well as an insular sense of communities 
                                               
255 Missouri has an “Ozark” culture of anti-black racism and white supremacy, but it also has the housing 
segregation and “its attendant social ills” of a northern-state.  See Marans and Stewart, “Why Missouri Has 
Become The Heart of Racial Tension In America,” The Atlantic, Nov. 16, 2015: 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ferguson-mizzou-missouri-racial-
tension_us_564736e2e4b08cda3488f34d.  
256 It should be noted that the Ozarks do not extend to the suburb of Ferguson, MO. 
257 Missouri also a rich history and tradition of jazz, blues, and barbeque associated with the region.	
258 It has been noted that the “Ozarks” have two differing cultures (both predominantly white): (1) the 
traditional white supremacist culture; and (2) a more-accepting white, gay culture which still struggle as a 
community to deal with issues of racism.  See Morris, “For Two Ozarks Communities, A Stark Contrast in 
Culture,” National Public Radio, May 12, 2014: https://www.npr.org/2014/05/12/310998299/for-two-
ozarks-communities-a-stark-contrast-in-culture. 
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(i.e., those being made up of those with “shared beliefs”).259  While Minnesota helps lead 
refugee resettlement efforts, the state is still largely homogenous.  Even where there is 
diversity in most of Minnesota, the demographics for whites are still usually higher than 
the national average.260  This insular nature of Minnesotans allows a comfortable life to 
those homegrown, but at the cost of alienating newcomers.261  It should be noted that the 
population-ratio of those born in-state and those from out of state have changed 
dramatically compared to what they were 30-40 years ago (90%-10% to 70%-30%), but it 
has been noticed that this insular nature can especially have a negative effect on retaining 
minority professionals.262  Minnesotans’ strong sense of loyalty to their community 
allowed for the crowds to grow so quickly and become so hostile and emotional.   
Minnesota additionally has a strong culture of professionalism (i.e., holding 
oneself to the highest standard in everything whenever possible) and its importance in 
preventing large civil disturbances was made case-in-point throughout the Fourth 
Precinct Occupation of November 2015.  It was from the professionalism of city and 
police leadership that assisted to keep the North Minneapolis occupation from escalating 
into violent riots.263  This professionalism was directly mentioned in the after-action 
report in how MPD officers consistently responded with resilience to the harassment and, 
the occasional, assault of hostile demonstrators.264  This mentality is also applicable to 
                                               
259 I would argue that this [tradition] is related to North Minneapolis, MN being the historically ‘minority’ 
section of the city, as well as the prominence of white supremacist chapters downtown in its earlier history. 
260 Yuen, “Newcomers say it’s ‘nice,’ but not warm,” Minnesota Public Radio News, March 12, 2012: 
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2012/03/12/outsiders1-is-minnesota-nice-to-newcomers 
261 Ibid. 
262 It is described that this “coldness” to those of different ethnicities or cultures are based less out of apathy 
and more of a lack of awareness to other cultures.  On the flip side, most Minnesotans are willing to accept 
others (from a distance) into the community (e.g., jobs) but so long as they do not have to think about the 
other person’s culture.  As described in the article, “Minnesotans are generous, but detached.” See Ibid. 
263 After Action Report: MPD, p. VIII. 
264 During MPD officers’ long-shifts, over the 18-day period, they would not be able to leave the building 
unless on perimeter duty.  Ibid., p. VII-VIII. 
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BLM protesters’ actions in the form of training sessions put on by Training for Change in 
October 2015, where demonstrators learned about, “the skills to confront challenges and 
facilitate difficult moments.”265   After the occupation camp had been cleared, on 
December 3, Police Chief Harteau sent an email to all MPD officers thanking them for all 
their dedication and how she was proud that, “we lead the way in best practices in 21st 
Century policing.”266  At the time of the North Minneapolis Occupation, new best 
practices focused on community-oriented policing had been established267 and circulated 
throughout the law enforcement community regarding response efforts to mass 
demonstrations similar to the “Ferguson Unrest.”  While the protest response from MPD 
leadership was professional and maintained strict focused on ending the situation 
peacefully, low officer-diversity coupled with the ‘everyday policing’ culture of racial 
discrimination, excessive use-of-force, and little to no consequences for certain unlawful 
acts is what led to the shooting of Jamar Clark and the ensuing protests.  One of the 
protest leaders, Nekima Levy-Pounds, commented to a local news outlet after the release 
of the report describing the situation as, “a natural outcome of decades of police 
misbehavior… and rifts in city government.”268  The cultures of each area seem to be 
related to the policing models implemented during each of the protest incidents and those, 
in turn, effected the amount of violence experienced overall. 
                                               
265 Celia Kutz, “How Black Lives Matter came back stronger after white supremacist attacks,” Waging 
Nonviolence (November 30, 2015): https://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/black-lives-matter-came-back-
stronger-white-supremacist-attacks/. 
266 See Minneapolis Police Department internal email, reviewed by assessment team August–November 
2016 as cited in Ibid., p. 38. 
267 By the President’s Taskforce on 21st Century Policing. 
268 Belz and Jany, “Federal review: City response to 4th Precinct protests was ‘peaceful and measured’ 
despite lack of communication,” Star Tribune (March 20, 2017): http://www.startribune.com/federal-
review-city-response-to-4th-precinct-protests-was-peaceful-and-measured-despite-lack-of-
communication/416619743/. 
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Protest Policing Findings 
Threat-Repression Theory (P1) 
Three primary social movement paradigms contend that certain protest 
characteristics, and combinations thereof, can been linked to a heightened probability of 
protest repression and/or violence occurring but according to the threat-based theory (per 
Earl 2003),269 movements can “threaten” authority figures through characteristics such as 
the protesters’ goals, number of protesters, and their implementation of either new, 
multiple, or confrontational protest tactics.270  The 17 days of demonstrations that 
occurred in Ferguson, MO exhibited many of these “threatening” protest characteristics.  
The speed at which the number of protesters grew consistently took law enforcement off-
guard, appeared “threatening,” and regularly prompted repressive and tactical police 
responses.  The “Ferguson Unrest” saw an unprecedented use of social media in tandem 
with traditional (nonviolent) protest tactics (e.g., marches, vigils, chanting, sit-ins), which 
it utilized to strengthen the movement’s momentum and take advantage of law 
enforcement’s lack of preparation.  While many of the daytime protesters remained 
peaceful, confrontational and violent tactics were commonly utilized following the 
occurrence of police-repression and, more commonly, throughout the nighttime 
demonstrations.  Multiple protest factions, with varying tactics and goals, operated during 
the demonstrations, making it even more difficult for law enforcement to respond 
uniformly.  Peaceful and violent protesters both wanted justice for Brown’s death (i.e., 
prosecution of the involved-officer along with police reform measures), but it was from 
                                               
269 Thomas N. Ratliff, “On the Stage of Change: A Dramaturgical Approach to Violence, Social Protests, 
and Policing Styles in the U.S.,” (PhD diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2011), 14-
15.   
270 Characteristics linked to threatening authority figures are derived from the following: Bromely and 
Shupe 1983; Davenport 2000; McAdam 1982; and Wisler and Guigni 1999 as cited in Ibid. 
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the radical goals of violence-oriented factions (i.e., “militants” targeting police and 
looters targeting community businesses) that promoted a “threatening” perspective 
among law enforcement and city officials.   
The “Ferguson Unrest” had many (not clearly distinguishable) groups/factions 
which participated in the August 2014 demonstrations, making it increasingly difficult for 
law enforcement to respond effectively in a uniform-manner.  There were four primary 
factions, each with varying tactics and goals: “militants,” looters, peaceful protesters, and 
the elderly.271  “Militants” and looters were the primary users of violence and 
confrontational tactics during the nights of protest following Michael Brown’s death.272  
Growth in group-size was found to have a connection with “militants” and looters 
increasing the severity of their confrontational tactics.  After August 12 and 13, large 
influxes of people from other regions started coming into Ferguson and started to make 
up large portions of these more-violent factions.273  Those who were a part of these 
factions were considered radical by authority figures and saw their goals to be, by using 
violence when necessary, standing up to ‘the [white] system’ while “getting back 
justice,” with reasoning either for the killing of Brown or just for how they feel the 
system had mistreated them.274   
The faction of “peaceful protesters” tend to be the minority-group in the streets 
after nightfall, whose goals are more widely accepted as they aim to non-violently 
                                               
271 Emily Wax-Thibodeaux and DeNeen L. Brown, “Ferguson protesters: The peaceful, the elders, the 
looters, and the ‘militants,’” Washington Post, August 18, 2014: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ferguson-protesters-the-peaceful-the-elders-the-looters-and-the-
militants/2014/08/18/d6be1262-26f3-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html?utm_term=.da52088a1b08. 
272 COPS, Ferguson After-Action. Note: Primary difference between the two violent factions is that: 
“militants” focused on committing violence while also looting, and the looters focused on stealing and 
criminal activity with the occasional use of violent force.     
273 Ibid., p. 18. 
274 See interviews with “militants” from Wax-Thibodeaux and Brown, “Ferguson Protesters.” 
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confront the issue of continued shootings of African Americans while positively 
impacting Ferguson, MO.275  The “peaceful” group is similarly made up of people from 
all over, although many were noted as self-described activists who participated in the 
Occupy Movement.276 One of the non-violent groups sets up in the neighborhood and 
distributes water and fruit and is led by music producer Ronnie Natch.277  Each day 
members of this group are dispatched to clean up trash and broken glass around the 
affected neighborhoods.  The other group is the elderly, an example of this is how Malik 
Shabazz, national president of Black Lawyers for Justice, goes out to keep the peace each 
night as he walks down West Florissant Avenue with a megaphone telling young people 
to return home.278  Many of this group more often attend demonstrations and speeches in 
the daytime but are more reluctant (out of fear for safety or health) to remaining active 
into the night.  Keeping the peace and promoting love over fear and hate are the primary 
goals for this group (the elderly involved with the Ferguson protests), but they serve a 
special role in the attempt of minimizing the negative influences that often occur due to 
younger protesters, primarily at night.  It is still not clearly understood why, but it has 
been noted that the likelihood of experiencing police violence declines with age.279  This 
pattern could prove useful for elderly activists by giving them a heightened-role when it 
comes to maintaining peace between younger protesters and police officers.   
This theory predicts Ferguson demonstrators to be viewed as “threatening” to 
authority figures and for them to experience police repression.  Due to the protesters’ 
goals, numbers, and tactics, protesters involved with the “Ferguson Unrest” were seen to 
                                               
275 Ibid. 
276 Ibid. 
277 Ibid. (Interview with Ronnie Natch). 
278 Ibid. (Interview with Malik Shabazz). 
279 See Rory Kramer, Brianna Remster, Camille Z. Charles, “Black Lives and Police Tactics Matter,” 
Contexts, Vol 16, Issue 3 (October 2017): p. 20-25, https://doi.org/10.1177/1536504217732048. 
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be “threatening” by law enforcement, throughout the 17 days, and this led to consistent 
instances of protest-repression in-line with predicted results.   
The occupation and protests of North Minneapolis, MN saw large numbers of 
demonstrators who repeatedly outnumbered law enforcement as they surrounded the 
MPD Fourth Precinct.  The 18 days of demonstrations experienced new combinations of 
protest tactics (i.e., the mix of traditional marching, chanting, and sit-ins with a “shanty 
town” occupational set-up outside the Fourth Precinct) as well as the use of multiple 
tactics at once.  Confrontational tactics were regularly used but most violent protest 
behavior (e.g., objects thrown at officers) was exhibited during the evening.  While the 
demands of BLM, the NAACP, and the Black Liberation Project may have come across 
as “radical” to law enforcement and city officials, these specific groups were not seen as 
“threatening” as the looters and “militants” of the “Ferguson Unrest.”  The primary goal 
held by the North Minneapolis, MN demonstrators was the release of the videotapes 
related to Jamar Clark’s shooting.  Law enforcement’s general impression of protesters 
was “threatening” because of the regular atmosphere of hostility and violence which 
surrounded the Fourth Precinct during the evening demonstrations.  The situation became 
increasingly dangerous to officers to the point that most on or off-duty were not allowed 
to leave the precinct for their own safety, and those who did had to be bused in and out.  
While specific groups involved with the North Minneapolis Fourth Precinct occupation 
may have been perceived as less-threatening than certain factions involved in Ferguson, 
the general perception of demonstrators was found to be quite “threatening” by law 
enforcement.  Ferguson experienced factions of demonstrators with radical goals such as 
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looting, vandalism, and initiating violence against police officers.280  This theory 
contends that because North Minneapolis, MN protesters were regularly seen as 
“threatening” to law enforcement, due to their large numbers and confrontational tactics, 
they would experience regular police repression in response to this.  Even though many 
protesters were viewed as “threatening,” the occurrence of protest-policing violence or 
repression was rare.  Any use of repressive-force by law enforcement was inherently 
limited by leadership,281 and the few cases where it was not as limited saw widespread 
criticism.282  If it was not for city leadership refusing to authorize use-of-force in hopes of 
ending the occupation peacefully, MPD officers could have implemented more 
repression-based tactics from the start of the protests as the crowds became increasingly 
“threatening.”  It should be noted that protesters’ knowledge of the political pressures 
from city and police leadership to end the occupation peacefully could have affected the 
use and intensity of confrontational tactics. 
  
                                               
280 Emily Wax-Thibodeaux and DeNeen L. Brown, “Ferguson protesters: The peaceful, the elders, the 
looters, and the ‘militants,’” Washington Post, August 18, 2014: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ferguson-protesters-the-peaceful-the-elders-the-looters-and-the-
militants/2014/08/18/d6be1262-26f3-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html?utm_term=.da52088a1b08. 
281 Two primary examples of this: (1) when the vestibule was cleared, on day four, officers did so without 
tactical helmets to improve their public image.  (2) When the CART unit was implemented, on days three 
and four, there was another tactical unit on standby, ready to be deployed if necessary, but SWAT teams 
had to be deployed without the Bearcat transport because it looks too “militaristic.”  This decision was 
widely criticized among SWAT team members for concerns dealing with officer well-being.  See citation 
on p. 15 of the After-Action Report: MPD, referencing Chapter 7, “Officer Safety, Resilience, and 
Wellness” beginning on page 115 of the report.   
282 This was seen when both protesters and city officials complained about MPD’s use of chemical agents. 
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Chart 8: Findings and Police Practice and Protest Interaction Theories 
Theory Name (P1, 2, 3) Findings  
P1: ‘Threat/Repression’ Theory -Ferguson Unrest had multiple protester-
factions that implemented a variety of tactics 
for a range of goals. 
-N. Minneapolis had members from BLM, 
multiple NAACP chapters, the Black 
Liberation Project, faith leaders, and 
unaffiliated community members. 
-Ferguson had hundreds of protesters in the 
streets every day and night; primarily African 
American but also others.283   
-N. Minneapolis had hundreds of protesters 
outside the Fourth Precinct with a peak of 
1000; primarily people from North 
Minneapolis although ethnically diverse.284 
P2: ‘Tactical Innovation’ Theory -Ferguson Unrest exhibited the associated-
characteristics of tactical innovation (T.I.), was 
viewed as “threating,” and experienced regular 
repression that stemmed from those 
characteristics. 
-N. Minneapolis greater exhibited the 
associated-characteristics for T.I., was largely 
seen as “threatening,” and yet experienced far 
less repression rooted from this approach. 
P3: ‘Dynamic Interaction’ Theory -Most instances of protest violence during 
Ferguson followed the ‘dynamic interaction’ 
theory, but there were a few cases where police 
officers were able to initiate violence without 
interaction with protesters. 
-Almost all cases of protest violence in North 
Minneapolis followed the theory’s model 
requiring both sides to interact to initiate 
uncontainable violence and damage. 
 
 
                                               
283 Numbers of protesters are approximated with a range from small groups to hundreds to around one-
thousand, and the “minority presence” variable can be generally evaluated through area demographics, 
second-hand accounts, and social media footage.  Primarily black before people from other regions started 
arriving in Ferguson, MO around August 12 & 13. 
284 Note: Ethnicities and backgrounds became notably more diverse as more outsiders, in need of food and 
shelter, arrived at the occupation camp in North Minneapolis, MN on November 27. See After Action 
Report: MPD. 
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Tactical Innovation Theory (P2)  
 Another police practice theory stresses tactical innovations, McAdam 1983; Wang 
and Soule 2016 argue that “tactical innovation is rooted in movement-opponent 
dynamics.”  It is conceptualized that tactical innovation takes place when a new protest 
tactic or a new re-combination of older tactics occurs, and that this can be brought on 
from forces of change either within the movement or external to it. 285  Overall, Ferguson, 
MO did not experience many tactical innovations.  The primary tactical innovation that 
occurred in Ferguson was facilitated through the protester’s use of social media and 
personal communications (i.e., text message) to organize large crowds, in short amounts 
of time, into mass demonstrations.  The use by black rights/anti-police protesters of social 
media as a tactical resource and organizational base, I would argue, qualifies it as a new 
protest tactic.  Another instance of tactical innovation occurred, starting on August 12, 
when “hactivists” targeted city and police servers (i.e., through DDoS attacks and 
“doxing”).286  North Minneapolis exhibited [more] instances of tactical innovation than 
did Ferguson, primarily through their use of occupational tactics.  Overall, the 
“Northside” occupation of the Fourth Precinct facilitated multiple instances of tactical 
innovation through the novel re-combination of occupational tactics with those of 
traditional marches, “no cop zones,”287 acts of inconvenience (i.e., blocking highways), 
                                               
285 Example of an internal change to movement processes can be, changes in the characteristics of the 
organization or actors, while external changes can take the form of police repression or shifts in political 
authority. 
286 This tactic for protesting combined with the BLM social (media) movement, I would argue, qualifies as 
a novel re-combination of older protest tactics. 
287 “No cop zones” have been utilized by BLM protesters in the past, primarily seen in NYC (2015), but it 
was through combining the tactic with that of starting the occupation of the Fourth precinct that qualifies 
this as tactical innovation by novel re-combination. 
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and the creation of a “shanty-town.”288  This is in addition to, for a short time, the 
occupation of the police precinct’s front vestibule in protest of the officer-involved 
shooting.   
Throughout my research, a question remained unanswered by existing literature: 
does, and if so how can, tactical innovation effect the actions (violent or nonviolent) of 
law enforcement during situations of mass demonstrations?  An initial hypothesis was 
that the more tactical innovation experienced would correlate to an increased likelihood 
of law enforcement responding with repression. This being based on the findings of Earl 
(2003) which support the notion289 that the dependent variables for ‘tactical innovation’ 
are inherently linked to protest characteristics which lead to an increased likelihood of 
protest-policing violence per Bromely and Shupe 1983; Davenport 2000; McAdam 1982; 
and Wisler and Guigni 1999.290  Tactical innovation has been linked to protest success 
per McAdam et al.;291 and Wang and Soule 2016.292  Because Ferguson experienced less 
tactical innovation than North Minneapolis, analysts using these theories would contend 
that North Minneapolis would experience greater levels of repression following these 
                                               
288 Shanty-towns being differentiated from traditional occupations/sit-ins being the establishment of 
“durable structures.”  This was seen by MPD to have started after rumors spread of an “imminent” police 
raid on Nov. 30. 
289 Tactical innovation occurs when new protest tactics or multiple tactics are combined to create a “novel 
re-combination per Wang and Soule (2016).  Earl (2003) argues certain protest characteristics have been 
linked to law enforcement perceiving protesters as “threatening” (which then raises the likelihood of 
repression), which include: protesters’ use of new tactics, multiple tactics, and/or confrontational tactics; 
number of protesters at the event; and the level of radicalism for each factions’ goals.  The first two “threat 
characteristics” match those which tactical innovation is, partly, dependent on.  It is of note that tactical 
innovation can be spurred through external changes such as police repression, so police repression can be 
both the response to and cause of tactical innovation.         
290 See Ratliff, “On the Stage of Change,” p. 14. 
291 See McAdam 1983; McCammon 2012; Morris 1984; Taylor and Van Dyke [2004] 2008 as cited in 
Wang and Soule, Tactical Innovation in Social Movements (2016). 
292 Tactical innovation/interaction is linked with protest success for the following reasons: (1) innovation 
temporarily increases the protesters’ bargaining power and (2) the emergence of new protest techniques can 
be correlated to peak-moments in a movements’ activity.  See Doug McAdam, “Tactical Innovation and the 
Pace of Insurgency,” (1983) University of Arizona. 
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incidents.  North Minneapolis experienced more incidents of repression293 (prompted by 
characteristics supportive of tactical innovation) than did Ferguson.  This is despite that 
Ferguson had more overall protest-policing violence than did North Minneapolis.  
Tactical innovation has been shown to have a positive connection to protest success and 
can be facilitated by the emergence of either new or novel re-combinations of older 
protest tactics.  It appears that tactical innovation also increases the likelihood of police 
repression during protests because protesters’ implementation of new or multiple 
tactics/techniques have additionally been linked to repressive police-responses (i.e., 
increased likelihood of protest-policing violence).  Thus, increasing the chance of protest 
success through tactical innovation also increases the risk for violence to occur, and that 
tactical innovation can be cause or be caused by police repression.  
 
Dynamic Interaction Theory (P3) 
A final police practice theory argues that dynamic interactions between all actors 
involved with a protest are argued to be linked to the emergence of collective violence 
per Ratliff 2011.  It is also argued that violent confrontations (i.e., an uncontrollable 
incident of violent civil disorder and rioting) between police and protesters cannot be 
initiated without first surpassing a violence-inhibition threshold which requires active-
participation from both sides per Collins 2008, 2009; and Nassauer 2016.  If violent 
confrontations cannot be initiated by a single set of actors (e.g., protesters, counter-
protesters, and police), then it would be expected that demonstrations in both Ferguson 
and North Minneapolis would only result if both police and protesters initiate violence.  
                                               
293 North Minneapolis, MN saw four main incidences of tactical innovation, with three of them prompting 
repression (eventually).  Ferguson, MO saw only two main incidents of tactical innovation, with only one 
resulting in repression/protest-policing violence. 
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While most violent confrontations among the “Ferguson Unrest” were initiated through 
the dynamic interactions of demonstrators and police officers, there were multiple cases 
in which confrontation was established almost solely through the actions of law 
enforcement.  In some cases, when protesters attempted to maintain an environment of 
nonviolence against the confrontational efforts of law enforcement, violent confrontations 
were typically initiated.  The North Minneapolis Occupation did not experience many 
instances of violent confrontation between police and protesters, but when they did, it 
was due to the dynamic interaction of both sides.  A supporting reason why there were 
fewer instances of confrontation, compared to Ferguson, is because of Mayor Hodges’s 
unwavering focus on ending the situation peacefully (i.e., refusing to authorize use-of-
force and limiting the use of military style equipment).  Throughout the occupation, 
protests exhibited confrontational tactics (e.g., verbal harassment, throwing objects, 
threatening officers lives) but these only led to violent confrontations when the police 
also participated in initiating violence.  Despite previous academic findings, these cases 
have illuminated how violent confrontations typically require both sides but when law 
enforcement alone attempts to initiate violence, they are far more likely to succeed than 
protesters attempting the same thing.  The case of North Minneapolis highlights law 
enforcement’s important role in keeping protests from turning into civil disorders through 
their self-restraint when it comes to responding to protesters with repression.  This could 
mean that the power of police-restraint during protests has the potential to be highly 
influential when it comes to controlling the occurrence and intensity of violence.  
Macro-Contextual Findings  
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Each events’ contextual timing and sequence within the history of the movement 
and criminal justice reform assists in explaining the different reactions Ferguson, MO and 
North Minneapolis, MN had to police violence.  Tilly (1984) argues that, “when things 
happen within a sequence affects how they happen.”  Understanding path dependent 
sequencing of political processes requires that the temporal ordering of events having a 
significant impact on the outcome of future events per Pierson 2000; Thelen 2002.  
Focusing on the timing of events relative to one another can better explain complex social 
dynamics (i.e., black rights movement and police reform).  The trajectory of a movement, 
if there is one, operates based on the varying mechanisms associated with (positive) 
feedback loops.294 
 Ferguson, and the government reports which followed, served as an ignition for 
the civil rights movement of the 21st century and the events of August 2014 have 
significantly impacted future protests tactics, the movement overall, and 
police/community responses to their demonstrations in coordination with the historical 
context of the United States’ policing models.  The COPS director Ronald L. Davis 
described in the beginning of the Ferguson “after-action” report how these incidents of 
mass demonstrations are “more than a moment of discord in one small community” but 
rather a national movement for criminal justice reform that represents “a new civil rights 
movement.”295  The after-action report stated how law enforcement officials who were 
on-scene for the ‘Ferguson Unrest’ faced an “unprecedented situation” that has now 
                                               
294 The three mechanisms of feedback loops: positive reinforcement (Hacker 2002), event backfiring 
(Skocpol 1992), and historical conjuncture (Orren and Skowronek 2001; and Lieberman 1998).  See Glenn, 
The Two School, p. 155-156. 
295 COPS, Ferguson, MO “After-Action” Report, p. IX. 
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become a well-defined moment in policing history.296  If the Ferguson protests did not 
occur or occurred differently, the North Minneapolis Fourth Precinct Occupation could 
have ended with violence instead of peace.  Examining developments in the movement’s 
history, protest tactics, police responses, government reform efforts, and macro-historical 
changes in policing styles will prove illuminating in exploring the varied interactions 
these events had on the outcome and order of future events. 
Chart 9: Findings and Macro-Context Theories 
Theory Name (T1) Findings  
T1: ‘Timing/Feedback’ Theory -Ferguson’s police response (and militarized 
protest-policing in general) experienced a 
“backfire” effect.297  Ferguson’s protesters 
also experienced positive feedback (i.e., 
‘self-reinforcing’).298 
-North Minneapolis experienced positive 
policy outcomes following the interaction 
between agencies (i.e., historical 
conjuncture). 
 
Event/Historical Sequencing 
The historical sequencing of US policing styles299 played a major role in the 
emergence of the Black Lives Matter protest movement by providing the context of 
continued police-shootings of unarmed African Americans.300  The destruction associated 
with Ferguson quickly served as a lesson to law enforcement about their response-tactics 
to demonstrations, and even though other cities did not initially learn from it, Ferguson 
                                               
296 See US DOJ, COPS Office, Ferguson, MO “After-Action” Report on Response to Demonstrations as 
cited in Ryan J. Reilly, “’Provocative’ Police Tactics Inflamed Ferguson Protests, Experts Find,” 
Huffington Post, Sept. 9, 2015:  https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ferguson-protests-police-tactics 
report_us_55e622a3e4b0aec9f35506ad.  
297 This style of response became increasingly criticized and difficult to manage with pressures from 
protesters and the federal government. See Skocpol 1992.  
298 In the form of continued protests, federal support for the movement, and gradual policy-successes 
regarding police reform measures aligned with community-oriented policing.   
299 From ‘escalated force’ to ‘negotiated management’ to ‘strategic incapacitation.’ See McPhail, 
Schweingruber, and McCarthy (1998). 
300 Emergence of the movement first started with the death of Trayvon Martin in 2012 and the “not guilty” 
verdict for George Zimmerman.  
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did.301  Throughout the 17 days of demonstrations, slight shifts in protest-policing 
occurred as law enforcement struggled to maintain control over the situation.  Even after 
the first day, the negative effects military-style equipment and tactics had on protesters’ 
perspective of the police became better understood.302  A week into the “Ferguson 
Unrest” saw incident command change leadership (from St. Louis County PD to Missouri 
State Highway Patrol) as well as the first adaption police took in to how they responded 
to the demonstrations.303  Based on media and government reports on law enforcement’s 
response to Ferguson, there was exhibited consistent high degrees of violence, brought on 
by large numbers of prohibited behaviors coupled with little communication efforts 
between police and protesters.304  According to Gillham and Noakes (2007), the law 
enforcement’s response to protests can be characterized as ‘strategic incapacitation.’305    
In the wake of Ferguson, a goal of refining the standards of community 
policing306 was established by President Obama’s “Executive Order 13684.”  It was 
effectively achieved five months later, in May of 2015, by the President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing,307 and it has since been utilized by social movements (i.e., BLM) 
                                               
301 Following the “Ferguson Unrest” was major protests in Baltimore, MD and New York City, NY that 
ended in major civil disturbances similar, but not quite as shocking as, Ferguson, MO. 
302 The lesson of minimizing the use of military-style equipment was learned quickly after law enforcement 
used canines, tactical equipment, and snipers on the first day of the “Ferguson Unrest.”  
303 Under the leadership of Missouri State Highway Patrol Captain Johnson, greater efforts were made to 
communicate and empathize with the crowds rather than repress and intimidate them. 
304 This was until after the first week of demonstrations when Missouri State Highway Patrol Captain 
Johnson took over leading the incident-response, in which he made active-efforts to connect and 
communicate with the community.  See After Action Report: Ferguson, p.  
305 ‘Strategic incapacitation’ is the more aggressive policing model that utilizes military-style equipment 
and tactics, and typically uses force first and views protesters as threats.  See Wood (2014) 
306 The goal consisted of: finding and providing for the best partnership between law enforcement and local 
communities aimed at reducing crime and building trust.  See the President’s Task Force on 21st Century 
Policing.   
307 President Obama’s task force identified six pillars of importance: (1) Building Trust and Legitimacy, (2) 
Policy and Oversight, (3) Technology and Social Media, (4) Community Policing and Crime Reduction, (5) 
Training and Education, and (6) Officer Wellness and Safety.  This task force report additionally 
recognizes the ineffectiveness of relying on a single jurisdiction and has utilized the effectiveness of having 
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& related organizations (i.e., Campaign Zero)308 to comprehensively propose 
recommendations on policies involved with police reform,309 such as the promotion of 
‘procedural just behavior.’310  It was from these, and other, findings that law enforcement 
agencies, like the Minneapolis Police Department, were able to start implementing some 
of the lessons which help in explaining the different responses from each city.  The 
protest response of MPD exhibited relatively low levels of violence (from law 
enforcement), in part, because of the few behaviors considered prohibited coupled with 
the extensive communication efforts on the part of police and city leadership.  This would 
categorize their response as ‘negotiated management’ per McPhail, Schweingruber, and 
McCarthy (1998).311   
The context of continued officer-involved shooting with unarmed African 
Americans is what allowed for the 17-day situation in Ferguson to turn into a national 
discussion and, eventually, a movement all its own.  Due to the style of policing Missouri 
utilized in 2014 (i.e., strategic incapacitation), the Ferguson protest-policing response was 
highly reactive, aggressive, and relied heavily on militarized equipment and tactics.  This 
aggressive response had the effect of increasing violent protest behavior overall and, 
from here, it did not take long for law enforcement officials to start changing their tactics 
with the end-result of reducing violence.  Following the “Ferguson Unrest,” further 
                                                                                                                                            
a three-pronged leadership model, with jurisdictions in local government, law enforcement, and the 
community. 
308 BLM created ‘Campaign Zero’ to be a policy-focused project that generates police reform proposals.  
Their goal is to reduce racial bias and police violence against African Americans. 
309 Note: Community policing is defined by the office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) 
as: “a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships 
and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public 
safety issues such as crime, social disorder and fear of crime.” 
310 It has four key aspects: (1) treating people with dignity and respect; (2) giving individuals a “voice” 
during encounters; (3) being neutral and transparent in decision making; and (4) conveying trustworthy 
motives.   
311 The ‘negotiated management’ policing model is based in strong-communication which uses force as a 
last resort.  Initial efforts are in promoting protesters to police themselves.   
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protests occurred all over the nation, prompting greater government reform efforts as well 
as investigatory reports into police departments and their responses to demonstrations.  
Destructive and violent protests wrought havoc to major U.S. cities following the deaths 
of Freddie Gray (Baltimore, MD)312 and Eric Garner (New York City, NY).313  With the 
government reports and findings on Ferguson published, in addition to the continued 
violent protests throughout the country, changes in police tactics were becoming more 
apparent.  As police tactics shifted away from aggressive and militarized protest-
responses, the tactics employed by protesters expanded.  This could be seen in the 
development of “no-cop zones,” starting in NYC, as well as protesters’ use of that and 
other tactics (e.g., shanty-town occupation of the Fourth Precinct) in the North 
Minneapolis, MN protests.  Specifically, North Minneapolis, MN protesters were able to 
alter their tactics to better take advantage of the fragile political environment faced by 
Mayor Hodges and Chief Harteau.  This primarily took form as policy-change demands 
in coordination with negotiations for ending the occupation.  
North Minneapolis was able to avoid becoming the next Ferguson, partly due to 
the sequence of protest events (i.e., MPD was able to observe and learn from Ferguson’s 
experience the year prior and the government reports which followed) as well as the 
culture of professionalism that enhanced the ability for Minneapolis’ leadership to learn 
from and retain the lessons identified from previous demonstrations.  An important factor 
in explaining the different response in North Minneapolis is how those in the minority-
                                               
312 The protests in Baltimore quickly turned into riots after aggressive police tactics.  See Holly Yan and 
Dana Ford, “Baltimore Riots: Looting, fires engulf city after Freddie Gray’s Funeral,” CNN (April 28, 
2015): https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/27/us/baltimore-unrest/index.html. 
313 The protests in NYC remained peaceful when compared to Ferguson but multi-day protests for Eric 
Garner turned violent in Berkley, CA.  See Harrison Jacobs, “Eric Garner Protests Turn Violent in 
California,” Business Insider (Dec. 7, 2014): http://www.businessinsider.com/eric-garner-protests-turn-
violent-in-california-2014-12. 
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community expected something like Ferguson to happen.  A criminal justice professor at 
Metropolitan State University and member of the local NAACP chapter, Jason Sole, was 
quoted in an interview with the Star Tribune describing the context prior to the shooting 
of Jamar Clark.314  The key findings from the COPS “after-action” report on Ferguson 
got leaked in June 2015, five months before the occupation incident in North 
Minneapolis.315  This gave MPD even more time to learn for FPD’s mistakes, considering 
the report was not officially released until September of 2015.  Having a culture of 
learning and following the best practices available is what allowed for North Minneapolis 
to succeed (at least partially) in learning enough from the “Ferguson Unrest” to avoid the 
levels of community-level violence that ravaged Ferguson. 
 
Feedback & Policy 
Ferguson experienced multiple feedback mechanisms during the demonstrations 
of August 2014 due to the excessive-nature the actions committed by police and 
protesters.  While both were excessive in their use of confrontation and violent tactics, 
each experienced different a mechanism.  The police experienced a “backfire” because of 
their aggressive tactics in responding to the protests, which could be seen in increased 
effort on the parts of the federal government (i.e., President Obama’s “taskforce” and 
Attorney General Eric Holder going to Ferguson).  Even though the militarized response 
was highly criticized of, it was not until the after the repeated occurrences of violence 
                                               
314 Quote from Jason Sole, “We’ve been saying for a long time that Minneapolis was one bullet away from 
Ferguson.  Well, that bullet was fired last night.” See David A. Graham, “How Did Jamar Clark Die?” The 
Atlantic, November 18, 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/jamar-clark-is-the-
next-great-police-brutality-controversy/416418/. 
315 See US DOJ, COPS Office, Ferguson, MO “After-Action” Report on Response to Demonstrations as 
cited in Ryan J. Reilly, “’Provocative’ Police Tactics Inflamed Ferguson Protests, Experts Find,” 
Huffington Post, Sept. 9, 2015:  https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ferguson-protests-police-tactics 
report_us_55e622a3e4b0aec9f35506ad. 
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following the protests in NYC, for Eric Garner, and Baltimore, Freddie Gray, that 
significant changes in police practice and procedures could be seen.316  With the 
occurrence of each protest, government efforts to propose solutions and mitigate 
adversity increased, putting greater pressure on police departments that were slow or 
refused to make changes in accordance with the recommendations from the Task Force 
on 21st Century Policing.  Resisting federal efforts to reform policing became even more 
difficult once the reports and findings related to Ferguson were released.  This highlights 
how efforts to continue down the “old” path of policing became increasingly difficult 
(i.e., “event backfiring” per Skocpol 1992) after the responses to Ferguson, and how 
other efforts to promote policy reforms aimed at bettering the state of community-
oriented policing were strengthened.  This was despite Ferguson protesters use of violent 
and confrontational tactics and, unlike the police, the protest movement experienced self-
reinforcement from itself and the federal government per Hacker 2002.    
This self-reinforced sequence prompted the continued protests and policy reforms 
which led to MPD’s unique response to the North Minneapolis Fourth Precinct 
occupation.  North Minneapolis experienced the historical conjuncture mechanism per 
Liberman 1998; and Orren and Skowronek 2001.  Despite concerns from law 
enforcement over officer safety and wellbeing, city leadership had an intense focus on 
ending the protests peacefully and avoiding what happened in Ferguson.  Mayor Hodges 
was able to end it peacefully, despite resistance from law enforcement along the way.  A 
part of this strategy led to the adoption of certain demands made by protesters to include 
                                               
316 Seen in the practical responses of police to BLM protests through lessened use of military-style 
equipment and tactics in favor of greater communication before any confrontations are made.  Noted 
incidents of SWAT units not using full amount of gear (e.g., no helmets) when clear the from vestibule of 
North Minneapolis’ Fourth Precinct.  
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new or reformed policies, and most of them were met.317  The interaction effects between 
city and police officials with government agencies produced positive policy support 
throughout the occupation.   
Like movements and processes, policy decisions affect later policies, and are 
especially illuminating when they follow the pattern of feedback loops.  Skocpol (1992) 
argues that policies influence the creation of future policies.318  A large policy-win 
following Ferguson, MO (in the form of a self-reinforcing mechanism) was the 
widespread adoption and funding for police bodycams.319  This was commented on in 
2014 by executive director of the Police Executive Research Forum, Chuck Wexler, that 
efforts to promote the use of bodycams existed before Ferguson but that it garnered 
increased attention among police departments nationwide.320  In addition to this, 120 
communities established Civilian Review Boards321  for police misconduct, as of 
September 2015, as well as other reported successes.322  The use of bodycams quickly 
became an example of ‘policy diffusion,’ where policymakers from certain areas 
implement policies they learned of from other policymakers’ experiences.323  By the end 
of September 2014, it is reported that over 5,000 departments had some kind of 
                                               
317 BLM negotiators made a list of (5) demands on Nov. 29, and additionally called for Mayor Hodges to 
advocate for the ‘Working Families Agenda.’  See “The Working Families Agenda,” Democrats’ 
Committee on Education and the Workforce, last accessed November 9, 2015, http://democrats-
edworkforce.house. gov/workingfamilies as cited in After Action Report: MPD, p. 34. 
318 See Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, (1992) p. 152. 
319 While some view bodycams as another means of monitoring already disenfranchised groups, it was 
largely seen as a win because of the evidence it can provide following an officer-involved shooting. 
320 Ben Kesling and Pervaiz Shallwani, “Ferguson Shooting Helps Spur Police-Camera Use,” The Wall 
Street Journal, September 30, 2014.  
321 It is worth noting that Minneapolis had the Civilian Review Authority (CRA) as external/civilian 
oversight for police back in 2012, but those who started the program left after it became clear that police 
leadership would not listen to their rulings or recommendations.  See Transcript (statement by Jerry 
McAfee) at 188 as cited in US Commission on Civil Rights, Civil Rights and Police Practices: 
Minneapolis, (March 2018), p. 32: http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/2018/03-22-MN-Civil-Rights.pdf.  
322 Some policy success saw demilitarization federally, the use of grand juries in cases involving deadly 
force from a police officer, and a rise of officers being charged for crimes committed.  
323 See Mettler and Sorelle, “Policy Feedback Theory,” (2014), p. 152. 
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bodycams in use.324  A comprehensive list of 10 recommendations325 have been made 
from integrating the ideas from communities, researchers, and government reports.326  A 
prime example of this was seen in Orlando, FL where Campaign Zero helped push 
through reforms which added restrictions to police use-of-force with the help Police 
Chief John Mina.327  Since then, 28 states have enacted police-reform legislation 
endorsed by Campaign Zero.328 
US policing trends led to the context of regular police-involved shootings, 
allowing for an incident like the “Ferguson Unrest” could occur.  The police response 
brought about continued protest violence in Ferguson, MO and across the country, 
prompting heightened government involvement with criminal justice reforms.  From this 
development brought about a major shift in the promotion of community-oriented 
policing over past-models that relied on repressive uses-of-force.  The reports and lessons 
identified by government assessment-teams gave law enforcement agencies a standard to 
work from, bringing about gradual changes in how protest-policing is handled.  With law 
enforcement agencies shifting toward non-confrontational ways of dealing with protests, 
protesters started to adapt, as was seen in North Minneapolis, to these by implementing 
increasingly confrontational tactics.  The newest development in the BLM movement 
happened as a result in a large institutional change: the election of President Donald J. 
                                               
324 Kesling and Shallwani, “Ferguson Shooting.” 
325 Recommendation: (1) end broken window policing; (2) community oversight; (3) limit use of force; (4) 
independently investigate and prosecute; (5) community representation; (6) bodycams/film the police; (7) 
training; (8) end for-profit policing; (9) demilitarization; and (10) fair police union contracts. 
326 Recommendations were integrated from 80 campuses, the Black Liberation Collective, the Justice in 
Policing Toolkit (research organization), and the President’s Taskforce for 21st Century Policing. 
327 See Cordeiro, “How an Orlando data scientist is helping #BlackLivesMatter make the case against 
police violence,” Orlando Weekly (March 23, 2016): https://www.orlandoweekly.com/orlando/how-an-
orlando-data-scientist-is-helping-the-blacklivesmatter-movement-make-the-case-against-police-
violence/Content?oid=2478826.  
328 This information came from an interview with policy analyst and data scientist for Campaign Zero, Sam 
Sinyangwe. See Durgin, “Finding Common Ground with Black Lives Matter,” The National Review, (July 
13, 2016): https://www.nationalreview.com/2016/07/black-lives-matter-policies-conservatives-can-support/ 
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Trump and, equally important, the appointment of Attorney General Jeff Sessions.  
Decreased numbers of demonstrations have been noted since the election due to many 
BLM chapters focusing on effectively implementing policies at the local level (i.e., from 
protests to policies).329  
  
                                               
329 Note: The focus on local change comes at a time where the members of BLM recognize that, federally, 
they have lost their governmental allies. Now they are dealing with a President and Attorney General who 
prefer the ‘escalated force’ policing model of the 1950s-1960s and operate under the assumption that civil 
rights investigations in police department do more harm than good.    
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
Ferguson was a wake-up call to America in how African Americans are policed as 
well as how police respond to protests in the face of officer-involved shootings.  Violence 
was swift and unrelenting on the parts of police and protesters over the 17 days of 
Ferguson protests in August of 2014.  Even as leadership shifted over the course of the 
protests and more measures were put in place to limit confrontation, protest-policing 
violence was the regular theme of the demonstrations.  The after-action report on the 
police response to the Ferguson demonstrations produced 46 findings and over 100 
lessons.  This report was made in the hopes of guiding proper police responses for mass 
demonstrations for the other 16,000 police departments in the US.  The reports’ aim is to 
acknowledge the problems and solutions which occurred so that mistakes are not repeated 
in the future.  The report also acknowledges how the leaders who called for this report 
recognize that, “the truth often hurts, but selective ignorance is fatal to an 
organization.”330 
Although the Minneapolis Police Department was able to successfully maintain 
the peacefulness of the occupational demonstrations, there are still areas in need of 
serious improvement in how law enforcement agencies handle BLM-associated protests.  
In fact, the after-action report identified 36 findings and 71 recommendations dealing 
with, among others, aspects such as leadership, internal/external communications, use of 
force, officer safety, and community engagement.  Keeping the peace is only one part of 
this equation, and I would contend that only focusing on this aspect will inevitably bring 
negative consequences to the surrounding neighborhood as well as to the well-being of 
                                               
330 See After Action Report: Ferguson, p. IX. 
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the officers involved.  Considering Minneapolis’ experience in handling the occupation 
event based on previous lessons learned from other police departments, officer 
accountability has only slightly improved but the relationship of trust and legitimacy 
between MPD and the communities of Minneapolis is still lacking.  Many members of 
the community have commented for interviews with local news outlets how, even with 
changes in MPD leadership, they do not perceive real change in how their community is 
being policed and still do not trust police, city, or community leadership.       
America is at a crossroads for its policing tactics because, while police reform has 
come a long way, there is increasing pressure from President Trump and Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions to usher back in those aggressive police tactics of the 2000s. The 
investigatory-ability into police departments by the DOJ is not foreseen to be utilized 
under U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, making the existing reports and findings from 
recent investigations into police practices and protest responses more valuable.  This 
makes the path forward for policing more critical in the coming years and puts a majority 
of the responsibility on local and state levels.  It is up to the police departments and their 
municipalities to continue down the path of community policing and build upon the work 
of the previous administration.331   
I do not predict these kinds of protests ending anytime soon and, in fact, they 
seem to have an effect of self-perpetuation based on actions/events from outside and 
within the movement, so more effective actions must be taken to mitigate the chance of 
future BLM protests from turning into riots.  There is a need for a comprehensive 
perspective drawing from multiple theories.   
                                               
331 Reforming police policies as well as acknowledging the still-existing problems while repairing and 
maintaining relations between police departments and their communities. 
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The micro-contextual theories illuminated how the background history, 
demographics, and culture of an area can influence the occurrence and intensity of 
community-level violence.  This was primarily seen with a hard shift toward Ferguson 
becoming predominantly African American while still maintaining a police force and city 
government that is controlled almost exclusively by the white members of the area that 
started leaving Ferguson in the 1990s.  Without the time for previous experiences of 
community-level violence, Ferguson law enforcement had no way of preparing for the 
mass demonstrations that followed Michael Brown’s death.  The ‘ethnic diversity’ theory 
relates to the ‘community history of violence’ theory in how the ethnic diversity of an 
area can affect the levels of community-level violence, and this was seen through 
Ferguson and North Minneapolis.  Incidents of community-level violence, among African 
Americans, tend to happen after a major race-related incident or officer-involved 
shooting.  This also appears to happen more often in areas with more close-knit 
communities as well as minority communities who have been in the area for longer.  
Each area’s culture is affected by the kinds of people who live in it and, from this, affects 
how police regularly use violence in their everyday practices as well as during protests.  
An area’s history of community violence will also impact how police go about using 
violence because if a community turns violent without past-precedent, police may not 
know the best course of action and chose to use either violence or nonviolence.  While an 
area that has experienced community-violence will have a more informed law 
enforcement acting based on prior-knowledge for what followed past violent and 
nonviolent police actions.  Each micro-context theory alone did not illuminate much on 
the circumstances between Ferguson and North Minneapolis but, when combined, these 
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theories showed how the community-history prior to each event affected how it turned 
out (i.e., less diversity (among all ethnic groups) combined with a lacking history of 
community-violence allowed for the uncontrollable incidents of violence).       
The police protester interaction theories provided insights into the protest 
incidents of how and when protesters acted confrontationally/violently, when they were 
responded to with repression, and how they reacted to such.  It also explored the varying 
use of protest tactics between Ferguson and North Minneapolis and how incidences of 
tactical innovation influenced law enforcement practices.  The ‘threat/repression’ theory 
relates to the ‘dynamic interaction’ theory in how the perception of threat plays a large 
role in whether actors (police or protesters) initiate violence.  As was seen in Ferguson, 
when protesters were viewed as threatening, law enforcement used repressive tactics.  
Despite protesters being perceived as threatening, because of direct orders from city and 
police leadership not to physically engage law enforcement only used repressive tactics 
when deemed necessary (e.g., clearing the vestibule on day three or clearing the 
encampment on day eighteen).  The police practice and protester interaction theories 
alone illuminated the most because of their focus on the occurrences during each event.  
This is due to their analysis of what build up to confrontations, when confrontations were 
made, and how they were initiated as well as how they concluded.  In Ferguson, 
confrontations were built out of emotional tensions and levels of threat varying in 
between the protesters and police.  They occurred mostly in the evening and ended after 
hours of violence, while North Minneapolis experienced minimal incidents of 
confrontation, they were similarly built up through emotional tensions and lasted for 
hours at a time. 
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The macro-contextual theories provided even greater insights on the overarching 
sequence policing styles have on protest styles and vice versa.  These theories utilize 
police practice theories over history with those of timing, sequence, and policy feedback.   
Aggressive and discriminatory policing practices of 20th century America created a 
context of increased officer-involved shootings of, primarily, unarmed African 
Americans.  This context allowed for the Black Lives Matter movement to be born and 
flourish as shootings and protests continued to occur and adapt to changes in federal 
policies and police practices.  From these protest adaptations, law enforcement has also 
had to adapt its tactics under continued protests and pressure from all levels of 
government.   The macro-context theories were particularly helpful in understanding the 
“big picture” of all the small changes that happened in between shooting-inspired 
protests.  It was from the macro-related theories that I produced a graphic showcasing 
how, over time, police practices shaped BLM protester tactics and, from these changes, 
prompted further changes in the practices of police officers. 
There is a cyclical macro-historical pattern of policing styles affecting protest 
styles, and those changes in protest styles, in turn, affect future-policing styles.  The 
historical sequencing of US policing styles (from 1950 – 2010) provided the societal 
context of increased officer-involved shootings of unarmed African Americans which 
allowed for the Black Lives Matter protest movement to originate out of Ferguson and 
flourish throughout the nation.  From the initial reactions to the police response in 
Ferguson, state and federal government responses have been supportive of the BLM 
movement and their nonviolent protest efforts.  With the support of the federal 
government, BLM demonstrations have shifted in their use of confrontational tactics in 
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tandem with shifting police practices (i.e., from more to less confrontational during 
protests).  Law enforcement efforts in Ferguson were characterized with aggressive and 
militarized responses and over time, while under the continued pressure from the federal 
government to continue police reform efforts, these practices changed becoming more 
defensive.  In part due to this, he non-confrontational and defensive characterization 
accurately depicts the law enforcement response to the North Minneapolis Occupation.  
See Appendix B.  
As this study is exploratory in nature, there are some inherent limitations to my 
findings.  For instance, all analyses are conducted qualitatively and only examine a few, 
out of many, theories from each sub-type (i.e., micro-context; police protester interaction; 
and macro-context).  Additionally, some of the after-action reports state that some of the 
reports on each incident do have some conflicting accounts.  These two events (Ferguson 
and North Minneapolis) occurred more than a year apart, in different seasons, so it may 
be worth investigating whether two case studies with similar temporal factors would have 
different outcomes to the two used in this study.  Each theory alone does not fully 
illuminate the different reactions in Ferguson and North Minneapolis, but more can be 
understood by examining them all together and how they affect each other.   
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APPENDIX A: HISTORY OF U.S. POLICING STYLE & MODELS 
 
 
 
 The policing style of the mid-twentieth century has been labelled the ‘escalating 
force’ model and was known for being “strictly legalistic and hostile towards protests,” 
particularly from 1950 to 1970.  This model was known for its use of force in law 
enforcements agencies’ attempts to disperse disruptive or peaceful protesters (e.g., the 
May 1970 confrontation between students and National Guard soldiers at Kent State 
University).   
This trend toward more-aggressive policing styles for protests has been seen in 
Europe during the same time (i.e., 2002-2012), particularly well-shown in a study on 
Italian law enforcement per Calafati 2013.  Amnesty International released two reports in 
2012 critical of law enforcements’ “disproportionate use of violence during protests,” 
specifically focused in Greece, Romania, and Spain.  The major issues cited from the 
reports was excessive use-of-force, abuse of “less-lethal” weapons, obstructing access to 
medical services, and arbitrary detention per Amnesty International 2012 a, b.  This 
theory on the return of aggressive policing styles was argued by Della Porter & Reiter 
1998 to be merely the exception to the overarching trend of “softer policing” (i.e., a 
greater emphasis put on protecting people’s right to protest).  Under this trend of policing 
(as seen in western democracies, such as Italy), there is a certain amount of tolerance for 
violations of the law and repressive tactics are only saved as a last resort. Della Porter & 
Reiter 1998 argue that the primary goal of the police is understanding and utilizing tools 
to assist in the de-escalation of varying protest situations.  Della Porter & Reiter 2003, 
2004 argue how academics have been cautious in analyzing a comeback of violent protest 
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policing in Italy and argued that such cases in which the police response had been overly-
violent were exceptions to the rule.  Calafati (2013) cites, among others, an incredible 
incident of aggressive protest policing by Italian law enforcement during the anti-
globalization movements’ protests of the 2011 G8 Summit in Genoa per Jurris 2008; 
Della Porter & Reiter 2003, 2004; Amnesty International 2001, 2011.  Another 
examination of western democracies (i.e., Australia) show how policing styles have 
shifted, since the start of the 21st century, from a “negotiated management style” of 
policing to a “coercive style” per Baker 2008.  He argues (using examples like 
Melbourne’s Global Economic Forum 2000, Melbourne’s G20 summit 2006, etc.) the 
advent of the anti-globalization movement has a connection to the rise of western 
democracies using more “coercive style” tactics in policing protests.  He contends that 
this can be explained by the trend that when protests involve economic interests or people 
of importance (usually on an international-basis), the initial tactics of protest policing 
tends to be more coercive than negotiation based.  Baker 2008 contends the difficulty of 
avoiding violence is due to the need of building a dialogue, and the preparing of all plans 
& precautions prior to the event.         
The extensive implementation of community policing is primarily due to the 
congressional passage of the “Public Safety Partnership and Community Policing Act of 
1994.”332  When law enforcement agencies establish collaborative partnerships with their 
communities, these relationships tend to build trust between members of the community 
                                               
332 See Wells and Falcone, Policing in the United States, (2005).  This act authorized $9 billion in funding 
to be directed toward COP implementation, the hiring of 110,000 additional police officers, and created the 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (“COPS Office”) for its implementation.   
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and the police per Skogan, Steiner, DuBois, Gudell, and Fagan (2002a).333  Officers 
trained in COP engage the community as equal-partners and are well-versed in public 
relations, community partnerships, and problem-solving techniques, resulting in greater 
public support and cooperation with the police to better help combat crime.334  An 
example of a community outreach program is the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy 
(CAPS) program where community members participate in meetings with law 
enforcement and collaborate in the decision-making process per Skogan, Steiner, DuBois, 
Gudell, and Fagan (2002b).335 
Like other western democracies, the United States has also seen this aggressive 
trend of policing which followed during the height of community-oriented policing in the 
1990s.  These aggressive tactics have taken form in the gradual militarization of small 
and local departments, greater use of SWAT-team tactics, tougher responses to political 
protest, and a greater reliance on ‘war on drugs’ tactics like stop-and-frisk and “broken 
window” policing.  Scobell and Hammitt 1998 argue that militarized (or paramilitary) 
police tend to do the following: “deploy as units rather than as individuals; seek training 
from military personnel in the use of sophisticated weaponry, special apparel, and 
equipment; and adopt a system of rank that replicates the structure of the military.” 
  
                                               
333 See Skogan et al., 2002, Community policing and “the new immigrants”: Latinos in Chicago, 
(Washington DC, US DOJ): https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/189908.pdf as cited in Portland State 
University, Criminology and Criminal Justice Senior Capstone, "Police Community Partnerships: A 
Review of the Literature" (2011), Criminology and Criminal Justice Senior Capstone Project, Paper 7. 
http://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/ccj_capstone/7?utm_source=pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu%2Fccj_capstone
%2F7&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages. 
334 See Portland State University, Criminology Capstone, “Police Community Partnerships.”  
335 See Skogan, et al., 2002, “Taking stock: Community policing in Chicago,” (Washington, DC: U.S. 
DOJ): https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/189909.pdf as cited in Portland State University, Criminology 
Capstone, “Police Community Partnerships.” 
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